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CRIMINAL LAW
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU:
PENAL REFORM IN THE LATE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ERIN E. BRAATZ*
Conflicting interpretations of the history of the “cruel and unusual
punishments” clause of the Eighth Amendment play a significant role in
seemingly never-ending debates within the Supreme Court over the scope of
that Amendment’s application. These competing histories have at their
cores some conception of the specific punishments deemed acceptable at
the time of the Amendment’s adoption. These narrow accounts fail,
however, to seriously engage with the broader history of penal practice and
reform in the eighteenth century. This is a critical deficiency as the century
leading up to the adoption of the Eighth Amendment was a period in which
penal practices underwent numerous changes and reforms.
This Article closely examines the experiments in penal reform that
occurred in the American colonies immediately following the Revolution to
elucidate what the Founding Generation thought about penal form, how
and why it might change, and its relationship to the creation of the
American republic. It argues that these penal reform movements, which
have been ignored in discussions of the Eighth Amendment, were well
known during the founding era. Furthermore, the salience of these reform
movements at the time demonstrates a persistent concern among the
Founders with adopting a more enlightened or civilized penal code in order
to distinguish the American republic from monarchical practices in
England and Europe. Foregrounding the content of both the experiments
themselves and the debates over penal practice, they reflect yields
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important and previously unrecognized insights for our understanding of
the Eighth Amendment’s meaning and its import at the time it was drafted.
This Article helps illuminate current debates over the interpretation
and application of the Eighth Amendment, including the use of international
comparisons, the idea of evolution or progress, and the concept of
proportionality. It also exposes significant gaps and limitations in the
historical accounts relied upon by the Court to date.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of the “cruel and unusual” punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment plays a significant role in the ongoing debate over the
Amendment’s meaning and application.1 Those advocating a narrow
1

See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Court should revisit all Eighth Amendment cases beginning with Trop v.
Dulles because those cases have departed from “the historical understanding of the Eighth
Amendment”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–82 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 285–86 (1983) (arguing that the English Bill of Rights embraced the concept of
proportionality present in earlier documents such as the Magna Carta); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 288–89 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 passim (1972) (per curiam) (three of the five concurring opinions, as well as the dissent
examine the history of the Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389–
97 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (engaging in extensive discussion of the Eighth
Amendment’s history in order to refute the majority opinion’s holding that it requires
proportionality in sentencing); see also JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 31–65 (2012)
(arguing that Enlightenment authors, especially Cesare Beccaria, greatly influenced the

1. BRAATZ

2016]

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU

407

interpretation of the Amendment and those promoting a more expansive
one each invoke different elements of that history.2 Scholars and Supreme
Court justices who support a narrow reading claim to engage in a textual
history akin to statutory interpretation.3 Justices taking this approach argue
that it limits the Amendment’s protections to forms of bodily punishment
and torture considered cruel and unusual in 1791.4 This approach
problematically ignores the context out of which the text emerged, even
while ultimately relying on a narrow understanding of the form
punishments took in the colonies.5
Those who argue for a broader interpretation engage in a more
contextual analysis, pointing to the ideas and beliefs held at the time the
Amendment was adopted, either concerning the rights of Englishmen
generally or the writings of the Enlightenment.6 However, this approach
completely ignores the penal context, seemingly conceding the point that
punishments in 1791 were more cruel than those found today. Ultimately,
Founders); Charles W. Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the
Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 378–82 (1980);
Deborah Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive
Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 784–85 (1974) (same).
2
For example, compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 242–45, 254–55 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (interpreting history to indicate that the founders were particularly concerned
with discrimination), and id. at 259–65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the history
does not provide much illumination as to the Amendment’s meaning), and id. at 319–23
(White, J., concurring) (finding that the history of the clause “clearly establishes that it was
intended to prohibit cruel punishments,” but turning to case law to determine the meaning of
cruelty), with id. at 376–78 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the historical record
demonstrates that the Founders were only concerned with tortuous punishments).
3
See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981–85; Weems, 217 U.S. at 389–97 (White, J.,
dissenting); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 378–82.
4
See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977–81; Weems, 217 U.S. at 389–90, 404 (White, J.,
dissenting).
5
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using a history of
changes in how death sentences were carried out in order to advocate for a narrow
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s protections); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 268 (referring
to the “vicious punishments” occurring at the time of the English Bill of Rights as including
“drawing and quartering, burning of women felons, beheading, disemboweling, etc.” and as
being “common”); Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (defining the punishments addressed by the
“cruel and unusual” punishments clause of the English Bill of Rights as being “the atrocious,
sanguinary and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons
of criminals”).
6
See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86 (arguing that the English Bill of Rights embraced
the concept of proportionality present in earlier documents such as the Magna Carta);
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 289 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same); BESSLER, supra note 1, at 31–65
(arguing that Enlightenment authors, especially Cesare Beccaria, greatly influenced the
Founders); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 1, at 784–85 (same).

1. BRAATZ

408

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

BRAATZ

[Vol. 106

neither approach has convincingly established why such an Amendment
would be considered important enough to include in the Bill of Rights,
much less what it was intended to capture.
The picture that emerges from the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
history of the Eighth Amendment is that either the penal methods used in
the past are of little importance, or the only thing worth knowing about
penal form historically is that it was tortuous and cruel.7 This Article, in
contrast, demonstrates that penal form and the changes it was undergoing at
the end of the eighteenth century is highly relevant in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment. The attempts at experimentation that occurred during
this period make clear that the underlying concern leading to the Eighth
Amendment’s adoption was not horrible past punishments per se, but rather
the need to adopt punishments in keeping with republican (and as will be
seen “civilized”) government.8 The precise content of what this meant was
subject to debate, and yet some key assumptions regarding the desirability
of reform were largely shared across the lines of contention.9 This history
has not hitherto been examined in the context of the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment and it sheds important light on how attempts at penal reform in
the new republic may have informed understandings of that Amendment.
The changes that had occurred between seventeenth-century England
(also known as the Stuart Period of English history) and the American
Revolution were understood at the time in terms of cultural progress and
increasing civilization.10 The American republic was seen as a new
pinnacle along a continuum of progress, but not as the end point of that
progression.11 Indeed, the various local-level experiments in criminal law
reform that occurred between the time of the Revolution and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights suggest that the one thing the Founding Generation could
be sure of is that they did not know the final form the reform of the criminal
laws would take.12 Thus, in order to understand the meaning of the Eighth
7
Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86 (containing no examination of punishments used
in historical context), with Baze, 553 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Eighth Amendment is only intended to prohibit “tortuous punishments”).
8
See discussion infra Part II.C.
9
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28–29
(1967) (identifying Cesare Beccaria and his notions of a more enlightened penal practice as
one of a handful of thinkers embraced by loyalists and patriots alike).
10
See infra Part II.A and C.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra Part II.D. Bernard Bailyn argues that the important experiments with
republican ideology at the local level prior to the Constitution and Bill of Rights mark the
second phase of the ideological development of the American Revolution. The various
attempts at criminal law reform that occurred within the states traced in Part II, infra, can
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Amendment, it is not enough to acknowledge changes that had already
occurred at the time of the Revolution or the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
rather it is necessary to understand the place of these changes within a
larger narrative of what the American republic was understood by the
Founding Generation to be achieving at its creation.
By focusing narrowly on the specific words of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court’s historical inquiry has tended to treat particular penal methods in
a rather static way—as though the only distinction that can be drawn is
between the so-called “Stuart horrors” of the seventeenth century and
eighteenth-century penal practice.13 In contrast, various scholars have
argued that the shift in penal policy during this period was both gradual and
wide-ranging, and, in the words of Louis Masur “embodied the triumph of
new sensibilities and the reconstitution of cultural values throughout the
Western world.”14 The Eighth Amendment was not an end point within this
far-ranging development, rather it took form at a particular historical
moment within the arc of a deeper cultural change.15
This Article departs from previous histories of the Eighth Amendment
by drawing on the now considerable histories of criminal law and penal
reform in the late eighteenth century. These histories are sufficiently
detailed to permit a “thick description”16 of the debates and concerns
regarding the criminal law and punishment that occurred at the time the
Eighth Amendment was drafted and adopted. At the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s drafting, vibrant debates were occurring regarding the form
punishment should take within a civilized society and as an aspect of
republican governance.17 The history of penal reform outlined in Part II
thus be seen as part of this larger attempt to remake local institutions into a form more fitting
with the image of the new republic. At the same time, these local level reforms in turn
shaped how governance would be structured and thought about in the new republic. BAILYN,
supra note 9, at vii.
13
See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the ‘inflict[ion]’ of ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ must be understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to
include it in the Bill of Rights” and concluding that “the Eighth Amendment was intended to
disable Congress from imposing tortuous punishments”).
14
LUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 3 (1991).
15
See infra Part II.D.
16
To perform a “thick description” is to “engage with the frameworks of meaning
within which social action takes place.” DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN
SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 193 (1990). The term is best elucidated by CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973).
17
See discussion infra Part II.
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demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment must be understood to prohibit
more than a narrowly defined group of outdated penalties. Rather, it
captures an understanding about the fact and process of historical change.18
This paper goes beyond a history of the ideas that help us understand
the fact and process of penal reform, however. At the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted, there was a shift occurring in individual
sensibilities with regard to interpersonal violence and the site of physical
infliction of pain.19 The impact of this “way of feeling,” which is both
socially and historically determined, can be seen in Justice Scalia’s
admission that there is a limit to originalism when it comes to the Eighth
Amendment.20 While arguing for an originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation, Scalia conceded that although whipping would not have been
constitutionally suspect in 1791, he would have difficulty “upholding a

18

Although I am not myself an originalist, this does not mean that the argument here is
irrelevant to its adherents. My argument is most akin to that advanced by Paul Freund when
he asserted with regard to habeas corpus that “there is involved in such institutions or
practices a dynamic element which itself was adopted by the framers. . . . The organic
element in an institution ought to be taken into account . . . .” Paul A. Freund, Discussion of
William Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond
Cahn ed., 1954). Attempting to understand the meaning of cruel and unusual by focusing on
those practices that would meet that definition in 1791 misses the larger import of the phrase
which, I argue, was meant to capture the dynamism of penal reform in the late-eighteenth
century.
19
J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 111–12 (1986)
(finding a reduction in prosecutions for murder and manslaughter in Surrey, England
between 1660–1800, and arguing that this indicates “a developing civility, expressed perhaps
in a more highly developed politeness of manner and a concern not to offend or to take
offense, and an enlarged sensitivity toward some forms of cruelty and pain”); PIETER
SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: EXECUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
REPRESSION: FROM A PREINDUSTRIAL METROPOLIS TO THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 200–01
(2008) (arguing that changes in the form of executions throughout Europe indicate a
“fundamental change in sensibilities which set in after the middle of the eighteenth century”
and ultimately led to the privatization of executions and narrowing of the capital codes).
20
David Garland uses “ways of feeling” synonymously with the less popularly wellknown term “sensibilities.” GARLAND, supra note 16, at 213. He also uses the terms
“emotions” and “structures of affect,” all in an attempt to describe “[t]he range and
refinement of the feelings experienced by individuals, their sensitivities and insensitivities,
the extent of their emotional capacities, and their characteristic forms of gratification and
inhibition.” Id. He argues that “[t]he question of how sensibilities are structured and how
they change over time is important . . . because it has a direct bearing upon punishment,” in
part because “crime and punishment are issues which provoke an emotional response on the
part of the public and those involved.” Id. “[T]o the extent that punishment implies the use
of violence or the infliction of pain and suffering, its deployment will be affected by the
ways in which prevailing sensibilities differentiate between permissible and impermissible
forms of violence, and by cultural attitudes towards the sight of pain.” Id. at 214.
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statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”21 This is a statement that
relies on a way of feeling that is clearly separate from the Justice’s views of
how history determines the Eighth Amendment’s application. This
sensibility has itself been shaped over time. The history examined in Part II
thus seeks to explore how the Founding Generation thought about penal
change and its place within the creation of the American republic on an
intellectual level, as well as shifts and changes that were occurring at the
level of emotional responses to physical suffering and argues that both are
relevant to understanding the original meaning of the phrase “cruel and
unusual.” This Article will argue that it was this process of changing
sensibilities that was embodied in the Eighth Amendment, and that rather
than ossifying the sensibilities of the late seventeenth century, the
Amendment captured the belief that sensibilities would and should develop
and change over time.
Ultimately, this Article highlights two very different ways of
determining the meaning of a phrase. One approach, which is most
prevalent in the Supreme Court’s decisions, is formalistic, focused narrowly
on instances in the historical record where the precise words in question
appear, even while ultimately relying on an interpretation of their
application at one moment in time. The other seeks to recreate a world of
thought, a system of meaning and a way of feeling out of which a particular
phrase arose. My intention in this Article is to show that a historical
approach that seeks to fully engage with the context in which a text is
created yields insights that other historical approaches neglect. An entire
history of thought and meaning surrounded the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment, but has largely been overlooked in discussions regarding the
application of that Amendment.22 This history sheds important light on the
terms of current debates on the Court and in the scholarship over
application of the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, Part III will demonstrate that the history presented in Part II
is not only a history of the ideas and influences upon the Founding
Generation, it is also the first step in a history of how penal reform and
change has been understood throughout the previous two centuries and
more. In other words, the history of the intellectual and emotional
antecedents of the Founders’ thought is a story about our own antecedents
and continues to inform how the Eighth Amendment is interpreted not
because of the relatively recent focus on originalism, but because narratives
of progress, enlightenment, and civilized understanding, along with actual
21
22

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989).
See discussion infra Part III.
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changes in sensibilities, have shaped how justices in the nineteenth,
twentieth, and twenty-first centuries have interpreted the Eighth
Amendment.23 Understanding this history, separate and apart from the
history of the Eighth Amendment, is relevant for clarifying some of the
current debates over the Amendment’s application. Though this history is
too complex to provide easy answers to current questions, if American
jurisprudence is to engage honestly and rigorously with the history of penal
changes and reform, then the experiments with and discussions regarding
penal reform that occurred in the American colonies following the
Revolution, and the continuing impact of the underlying arguments and
beliefs, cannot continue to be ignored.
* * *
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes how the history
of the Eighth Amendment has been told in numerous Supreme Court
opinions. Part II then provides a thick description24 of the changes to the
criminal law and punishment that were occurring in the colonies following
the American Revolution. It explores the transformations those practices
underwent in three key states following the Revolution: Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. The reform movements in each are
presented as examples of broader cultural, intellectual, and emotional
changes that spanned not only the colonies but Europe as well. This Part
recreates the milieu out of which the Eighth Amendment emerged. It
argues that a confluence of various strains of thought, previously
unexplored in the literature on the Eighth Amendment, created a particular
attitude towards penal change that can be linked to broader ideas regarding
civilization and progress, as well as the very specific place of the new
American republic within that narrative. Part III then explores some
implications of this revised history for current debates regarding the
meaning and application of the Eighth Amendment. It examines how the
Supreme Court has relied on the concepts of civilization, progress, and
proportionality examined in Part II to interpret penal change and how the
history of those concepts themselves sheds light on their current application
and meaning.
I. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AT THE SUPREME COURT
This Part traces how the history of the Eighth Amendment has been
debated within Supreme Court cases. The first section discusses opinions

23
24

See discussion infra Part III.
See GEERTZ, supra note 16, at 3.
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that profess to rely on the textual history of the Eighth Amendment.25 This
approach purports to focus narrowly on discussion in the historical record
of the clauses’ specific words and tends to yield an interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment that limits the scope of its protections. The second
section examines various approaches to the history of the Eighth
Amendment that claim to support a more expansive view of the Eighth
Amendment’s application. The Supreme Court opinions that embrace this
approach view the relevant history more broadly than those embracing a
textualist approach by examining, albeit in a limited way, the context of the
Eighth Amendment’s adoption.26 However, this approach largely ignores
questions of penal change, which was a subject of vigorous debate at the
time of adoption, a debate in which many Founders participated.27 Indeed,
we will see that in practice both approaches share key assumptions about
penal form at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. By failing to
engage with the broader history of penal change, I conclude, neither
approach can provide an adequate explanation for how it was that any
specific punishment came to be seen as cruel and unusual, nor why a
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was important enough to
include in the Bill of Rights.
A. THE TEXTUAL APPROACH

Those justices that take a textualist approach to the Eighth Amendment
purport to focus on instances in the historical record when the term “cruel
and unusual” is specifically used. This takes them back to the origin of the
wording of the Eighth Amendment in the English Bill of Rights, adopted in

25

Part I.B refers to this approach as the “textualist” approach, borrowing from the
following definition provided by Justice Scalia: “The theory of originalism treats a
constitution like a statute, giving the [C]onstitution the meaning that its words were
understood to bear at the time they were promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described
as the theory of original intent. You will never hear me refer to original intent, because I am
first of all a textualist, and secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, you don’t care
about the intent, and I don’t care if the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had some secret
meaning in mind when they adopted its words. I take the words as they were promulgated to
the people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words.”
Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at Catholic University of America: Judicial Adherence to the
Text of our Basic Law: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996) (transcript
available at http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheoryConstlInterpretation.
shtml).
26
For a description of contextualism as an approach to intellectual and legal history, see
William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the
Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1068–69, 1076–79 (1997).
27
See infra Part II passim.
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1689 following the Glorious Revolution of 1688.28 From there, they
examine the adoption of the clause in various state bills of rights,
discussions over the need for a bill of rights in the Constitutional
Conventions and debate over the Eighth Amendment in the First
Congress.29 Although this approach claims to limit itself to textual
references, its basic premise that the meaning of cruel and unusual became
fixed in 1791 forces the justices using this method to ultimately depend on a
conception of what punishments were in use in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. For this reason, the relevant history examined by the
textualists ultimately goes beyond the specific terms used in the
Amendment, and examines some portion of the intellectual and social
history of the period. The opinions of three justices exemplify this
approach, Justice White, writing in dissent in Weems v. United States30;
Justice Scalia, whose interpretation of the history of the Eighth Amendment
is most fully articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan31; and Justice Thomas,
whose concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees32 most clearly demonstrates how
far from the text the justices taking this approach have ultimately strayed.33
Before we examine these opinions, however, it is necessary to set out
some of their background. A focus on what punishments would have been
considered cruel in the eighteenth century originated long before the more
recent debates over history and constitutional interpretation. Graphic
descriptions of past punishments created a baseline against which
contemporary penal measures were compared in the few nineteenth-century
28
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–53 (1969). The relevant wording is: “That excessive
baile ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall
punishments inflicted.” The Bill of Rights, 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2. (1688); see also
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969 (1991) (quoting more extensively from the English
Bill of Rights, including the preamble listing the harms the Bill of Rights was drafted to
address).
29
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 97–99 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 394–98 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
30
217 U.S. at 382–413.
31
501 U.S. at 966–75.
32
553 U.S. at 94–107.
33
While I focus here on how these opinions have a narrow view of penal form at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, John Stinneford argues that they also have an
overly simplified approach to the terms “cruel” and “unusual,” respectively. See generally
John Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441; John Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008). The approach taken here differs in arguing that the meaning of
the phrase “cruel and unusual” can be more fully understood if it is read against the
background of debates and discussions over penal reform in the new republic.
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meaning of the Eighth Amendment.34 For
involved a question over the constitutionality
(firing squad).36 In its opinion, the Court
execution discussed by Blackstone37 and

[Blackstone] admits that in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain,
or disgrace were sometimes superadded. Cases mentioned by the author are, where
the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the pace of execution, in treason; or where he
was emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason. Mention is also made
38
of public dissection in murder, and burning alive in treason committed by a female.

From this description of previously available punishments, the Court
derived the principle that “it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,
such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to
the Constitution.”39
34

O’Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Fields, J., dissenting); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). Numerous
state court decisions similarly found “cruel and unusual” provisions in state law to only
apply to “a punishment that disgraced the civilization of former ages and made one shudder
with horror to read of it.” LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 9 (1975) (citing People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 637 (1890); Whitten v. State,
47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872); State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 20, 36 (1838)). The graphicness of their
descriptions evokes the work of Karen Halttunen, who argued that over the course of the
nineteenth century, murder narratives in popular fiction increasingly contained “deliberate
use of pain and horror to generate readers’ pleasure, the peculiar ‘dreadful pleasure’ of
imaginatively viewing terrible scenes of violent death.” KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST
FOUL: THE KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GOTHIC IMAGINATION 61 (1998). She argues that this
was a result of a “revolution in sensibility we may call humanitarian, which in shaping
dramatically new responses to pain and death gave rise to a pornography of violence that
both fed a new taste for body-horror, and confirmed the guilt attached to that taste.” Id. at
62. This “revolution in sensibility” is discussed infra Part II.A and C. For our purposes, the
significance of Halttunen’s point is simply that because public infliction of pain was no
longer acceptable (for example, public executions were almost entirely abolished by the midnineteenth century), the graphic descriptions of past punishments were used in these
opinions as a means of reveling in past horror, while emphasizing the restraint of modern
sensibilities that reject such practices.
35
99 U.S. 130 (1878).
36
Id. at 130.
37
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370–71 (1979).
(“Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English reader, and do
honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking apparatus of death and torment,
to be met with in criminal codes of almost every other nation in Europe.”).
38
Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135. The opinion also cites Archbold’s treatise for examples “of
such legislation in the early history of the parent country,” though specific examples are not
cited. Id.
39
Id. at 135–36.
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The Court in In re Kemmler,40 which concerned the constitutionality of
electrocution as a method of execution, continued in this vein, pointing to
punishments that “were manifestly cruel and unusual, [such] as burning at
the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like.”41 The
consequences of focusing on these outmoded forms of punishment are
made clear by the Court’s conclusion that “[p]unishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death. . . . It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.”42 While debate over the history of the Eighth Amendment expanded
during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this tendency to reduce
understanding of past punishments to graphic lists of extreme penalties
continues to influence understanding of the meaning “cruel and unusual.”
The first justice to support a narrow interpretation using the Eighth
Amendment’s own history, rather than a limited history of penal form, was
Justice White who dissented in Weems.43 The majority held that the
punishment in question44 was disproportionate to the offense and therefore
in violation of the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause.45 Justice White,
in contrast, focused on the history of the Eighth Amendment to argue that it

40

136 U.S. 436 (1890).
Id. at 446.
42
Id. at 447.
43
217 U.S. 349, 382–413 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting a reading of the
Eighth Amendment that would embrace the concept of proportionality and instead limiting
his interpretation of that Amendment’s application to punishments that were considered
cruel and unusual in 1689 when the English Bill of Rights was adopted).
44
Weems was an employee of the United States government in the Philippines and was
accused of falsifying official documents, namely by “entering as paid out, ‘as wages of
employees of the Light House Service of the United States Government of the Philippine
Islands,’ at the Capul Light House, of 208 pesos, and for like service at the Matabriga Light
House of 408 pesos, Philippine currency.” Id. at 357–58. For this offense, Weems was
sentenced “‘[t]o the penalty of fifteen years of Cadena, together with the accessories of
section 56 of the Penal Code, and to pay a fine of four thousand pesetas, but not to serve
imprisonment as a subsidiary punishment in case of his insolvency, on account of the nature
of the main penalty, and to pay the costs of this cause.’” Id. at 358. “[T]hose sentenced to
cadena temporal and cadena perpetua shall labor for the benefit of the state. They shall
always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard
and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution.”
Id. at 364. Also included were certain civil penalties, including permanent disqualification
from public office and “subjection to surveillance” of the public authorities for life. Id.
Weems challenged his conviction on numerous grounds, including an allegation that his
sentence violated a provision of the American government’s treaty with the Philippines
Islands, which was identical to the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 367–
68.
45
Id. at 380–81.
41

1. BRAATZ

2016]

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU

417

did not include a proportionality principle.46 He made this argument by
tracing the wording of the Eighth Amendment back to a nearly identical
provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.47 The full contours of
Justice White’s analysis of the history of the “cruel and unusual clause” in
the English Bill of Rights are not directly relevant; what is of interest is his
definition of cruel and unusual punishments within the meaning of that
document.48 Justice White argued that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment was limited to the meaning of the same phrase in the English
Bill of Rights.49 According to Justice White, the term “cruel” in the English
Bill of Rights referred to punishments that “were the atrocious, sanguinary,
and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the
persons of criminals.”50 These punishments were “such as disgraced the
civilization of former ages, and made one shudder with horror to read of
them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc.”51 While seventeenth-century
English punishments would make “one shudder with horror,” Justice White
went on to remark that, during the period between the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights and the American Revolution, “‘[t]he severity of the
criminal law [in England] was greatly increased . . . [and] there can be no
doubt that the legislation of the eighteenth century in criminal matters was
severe to the highest degree, and destitute of any sort of principle or
system.’”52 This account thus portrays English penal practice as going from
bad to worse. However, Justice White goes on to argue that in America,
this type of punishment had largely become irrelevant by the time the
American Bill of Rights was adopted because by then, “as a rule, the cruel

46

Id. at 389–99.
Id. at 389–96.
48
Id. at 406. Debate over the meaning and relevance of the related provision in the
English Bill of Rights has been extensive; see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 279 (1998); IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS
ORIGIN AND MEANING 134–58 (1965); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
231–37 (1999); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791 at
1–6, 9 (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 21–23 (1977); Granucci, supra note 28, at 852–60; Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 378–82.
49
Weems, 217 U.S. at 394–95.
50
Id. at 390.
51
Id. at 404; see also id. at 409 (discussing how “the word cruel, as used in the
Amendment, forbids . . . [the infliction of] unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort to
inhuman methods for causing bodily torture, like or which are of the nature of the cruel
methods of bodily torture which had been made use of prior to the bill of Rights of 1689”).
52
Id. at 393 (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 470–71 (1883)).
47
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bodily punishments of former times were no longer imposed.”53 We will
see in Part II that this portrayal of past punishments relies upon a caricature
of the past, as containing punishments that were simultaneously cruel and
torturous while also largely disappearing from the American colonies in the
eighteenth century. Justice White’s argument in Weems, lacks a deep
analysis of the relevant historical context and the changes they did or did
not undergo in the intervening century. Instead, while purporting to trace
the text and its meaning, this account ultimately relies on expressions of
“horror” and short lists of extreme punishments.
While Justice White used the Eighth Amendment’s origin in the
English Bill of Rights to justify a narrow interpretation that limited the
Amendment’s protections to the types of cruel bodily punishments imposed
in England at the time, Justice Scalia ultimately argued that this history is
largely irrelevant because what mattered was what the drafters of the Bill of
Rights thought the words meant.54 He focused on statements and events in
late eighteenth-century America to distill the meaning of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”55 He started by examining the wording of the clause itself,
which does not mention proportionality, even though certain state
constitutions did explicitly require proportionality in punishments.56 Here,
Justice Scalia engaged in a classic form of statutory construction: pointing
to similar earlier documents that do use the term in order to demonstrate
that the drafters of the text in question did not intend to include said term.57
Next, Justice Scalia pointed to what he termed “contemporary
understanding,” which he found in the statements made during the
constitutional conventions, the debate over the Bill of Rights in the First
Congress, the actions of the First Congress and early commentary on the
clause, and nineteenth-century court decisions interpreting this or similar
state provisions.58

53

Id. at 395. He also stated that “judges, where moderate, bodily punishment was usual,
had not, under the guise of discretion, directed the infliction of such punishments to so
unusual a degree as to transcend the limits of discretion and cause the punishment to be
illegal.” Id.
54
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–75 (1991).
55
Id. at 977–81.
56
Id. at 977–79 (Justice Scalia cites the following state constitutional provisions
adopted before the Bill of Rights: N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XVIII (“[A]ll penalties
ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL
(“punishments should be in general more proportionate to the crimes”); PA. CONST. of 1776,
§ 38 (same).). Justice Scalia’s historical approach in this opinion is focused on rejecting any
notion of proportionality. This concept will be explored in more detail in the next part.
57
See id. at 977–81.
58
Id. at 978–85.
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Turning first to the constitutional conventions, the question of a
protection against cruel and unusual punishments only arose twice.59
During the Massachusetts Convention, Mr. Holmes argued that without a
Bill of Rights, Congress was nowhere restrained from imposing “the most
cruel and unheard-of punishments . . . and there is no constitutional check
on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild
instruments of their discipline.”60 During the Virginia Convention, Patrick
Henry made an impassioned plea that a Bill of Rights was required to
prevent Congress from permitting torture.61 From these statements, Justice
Scalia concluded that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment were narrowly
focused on methods of punishment and the only methods they found to be
cruel and unusual were those akin to torture.62
Next, Justice Scalia turned to the actions of the First Congress, which
“punished forgery of United States securities, ‘run[ning] away with [a] ship
or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars,’ treason,
and murder on the high seas with the same penalty: death by hanging.”63
59

See id. at 977–80.
2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1901).
61
3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445–48 (2d ed. 1901).
62
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979–83. This argument that the drafters were concerned only
with methods of punishment was first made by Anthony Granucci in an influential article on
the Eighth Amendment. Granucci, supra note 28, at 842–47. Although the heart of his article
focused on the meaning of the same provision in the English Bill of Rights, he first argued
that the Founders were concerned about preventing certain methods of punishment and that
in so doing they actually misunderstood the true meaning of the English Bill of Rights. Id.
Granucci has been cited in eight Supreme Court cases: Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968, 973 n.4,
974–75 n.5, 979; Id. at 1011 n.1 (White, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 289, 294 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 312 n.5 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287, 289 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 n.29, n.31 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 316 n.5,
318–19 n.11, n.13–15 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 376 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id.
at 419 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). This line of argumentation has not gone unanswered. The
fullest response came in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Furman, which concluded that:
60

It does not follow, however, that the Framers were exclusively concerned with prohibiting
torturous punishments. Holmes and Henry were objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, and
they cited to support their objections the unrestrained legislative power to prescribe punishments
for crimes. Certainly we may suppose that they invoked the specter of the most drastic
punishments a legislature might devise.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 260 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 980–81 (quoting 1 Stat. 114 (1790)).
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Justice Scalia contrasted the federal punishments with two contemporary
documents that pointed to an alternative approach.64 The first was the New
Hampshire Constitution, which required proportionality in punishments and
defined proportionality in a limited way: “‘[n]o wise legislature’—that is,
no legislature attuned to the principle of proportionality—‘will affix the
same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do
to those of murder and treason.’”65 He also pointed to Thomas Jefferson’s
Bill For Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, which “punished murder
and treason by death; counterfeiting of public securities by forfeiture of
property plus six years at hard labor, and ‘run[ning] away with any seavessel or goods laden on board thereof’ by treble damages to the victim and
five years at hard labor.”66 Because the legislation passed by the First
Congress did not similarly explicitly embrace proportionality, and instead
relied upon the death penalty as a punishment for a range of offenses,
Justice Scalia concluded that the Founders did not interpret the Eighth
Amendment to include a requirement of proportionality.67 Missing from
this analysis is any of the contemporary discussions regarding the need for
penal reform (which was widely accepted) and the various attempts that
were being made at this time to devise revised criminal codes that would
allow for more republican or civilized modes of punishing.68 Jefferson’s
bill was rejected by the Virginia legislature and, as will be seen in Part II,
although there were various state level experiments with hard labor
occurring at this time, none were advanced enough to serve as a model for
the newly formed federal government.69
Justice Scalia also cited two nineteenth-century commentators whose
arguments as to what constitutes cruel punishments resemble those found in
the nineteenth-century cases: “the rack or the stake, or any of those horrid
modes of torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of
fiendish passion” and “[t]he various barbarous and cruel punishments
inflicted under the laws of some other countries. . . . Breaking on the wheel,
flaying alive, rending assunder with horses, various species of horrible
tortures inflicted in the inquisition, maiming, mutilating and scourging to
death.”70 Thus, even while Justice Scalia’s opinion attempted to rest upon
64

Id. at 980.
Id. (quoting N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XVIII (1784)).
66
Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 220–22,
229–31 (Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905)). This bill is discussed infra Part II.A.
67
Id. at 980–81.
68
See infra Part II.
69
See infra Part II.
70
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981 (quoting JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE
65
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purely textual analysis, there is interspersed within it discussion of penal
form in the early American republic (though focused entirely on the First
Congress with no examination of state-level experiments) and of
punishments centered around racks, gibbets, maiming, mutilation, and
torture.71 His textual analysis thus demonstrates the limits of that approach,
requiring as it does some attention to the surrounding society and the beliefs
and understandings that were common at the time. Once one turns to
society to understand penal form, however, it is not clear what principle
limits the examination to penal form, rather than expanding the inquiry to
embrace penal reform, including why and how it is occurring.
The opinion that most openly embraces this approach’s reliance upon
conceptions of past penal practices is Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Baze, which like Justice White in Weems, and Justice Scalia in Harmelin,
provides a very narrow reading of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.72
Baze involved a challenge to Kentucky’s use of lethal injection.73 Justice
Thomas began his historical analysis by arguing that the “cruel and
unusual” punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment “must be
understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to include
it in the Bill of Rights.”74 The “historical practices” that he examined,
however, all focus on changes in the implementation of the death penalty.75
He argued that while death by hanging was the most common form of
execution, there were additional “tools” used to “‘intensify[] a death
sentence.’”76 He then cited examples, including burning at the stake,
“‘gibbeting,’ or hanging the condemned in an iron cage so that his body
would decompose in public view,” public dissection and “the worst fate a
criminal could meet . . . ‘embowelling alive, beheading, and quartering.’”77
He then emphasized the content of this last punishment by quoting a death
sentence imposed on seven men convicted of high treason (no date is
given):
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (2d ed. 1840) (referring to “improved spirit of the
age,” which led to adoption of Eighth Amendment) and BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF
AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832) (stating that “some other countries” in question “profess
not to be behind the most enlightened nations on earth in civilization and refinement”)).
71
Id.
72
553 U.S. 35, 94–97 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
73
Id. at 41.
74
Id. at 94.
75
Id. at 95–96.
76
Id. at 95 (quoting STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 54
(2002)).
77
Id. at 95–96 (quoting BANNER, supra note 76, at 72–74; BLACKSTONE, supra note 37,
at 376).
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That you and each of you, be taken to the place from whence you came, and from
thence be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, where you shall be hanged by
the necks, not till you are dead; that you be severally taken down, while yet alive, and
your bowels be taken out and burnt before your faces—that your heads be then cut
off, and your bodies cut in four quarters, to be at the King’s disposal. And God
78
Almighty have mercy on your souls.

Justice Thomas proceeded to argue that these forms of aggravated capital
punishment had “‘dwindled away’” by the late eighteenth century and
therefore would have qualified as “unusual” at the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted.79 He therefore used this graphic description of a
punishment that would have been “unusual” in 1789 to support the
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment was intended to capture only
“tortuous punishment.”80 Absent is any discussion of the use of these
penalties in the American colonies or any examination of broader changes
penal practices in the colonies may have undergone.
Thus, while Justice Thomas’s decision in Baze differs from the
examples we saw in Justice White’s opinion in Weems, or Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Harmelin in that he provided some contextual examination of
penal practices in England and, to a lesser extent, in the colonies, his
opinion ultimately rests upon a conception of past penal practices that
focuses entirely on graphic descriptions of their violence. By limiting his
examination to the changes in execution form that occurred between
seventeenth-century England and late eighteenth-century America, Justice
Thomas’s opinion in Baze, arrives at a very narrow conception of penal

78
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 96 (2008) (quoting GEORGE R. SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 179 (1950)).
79
Id. at 97 (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 70
(2012)).
80
Id. Although not directly relevant to the history of the Eighth Amendment, some
justices have sought to argue the irrelevance of this history that relies on histories of
previous types of punishment to define the meaning of cruel and unusual. Justice Brennan in
Furman points to earlier cases that “proceeded primarily by ‘looking backwards for
examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause.’” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377
(1910)). He argued that, “[h]ad this ‘historical’ interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause prevailed, the Clause would have been effectively read out of the Bill of
Rights,” and cites to examples of this happening. Id. He begins first with Justice Story, who
concludes “that the provision ‘would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government,
since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or
justify such atrocious conduct,’” and then Justice Cooley, who said “the Court, ‘apparently
in a struggle between the effect to be given to ancient examples and the inconsequence of a
dread of them in these enlightened times, . . . hesitate[d] to advance definite views.’” Id. at
265 (internal citations omitted).
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change, both what it entailed and how it occurred.81
B. THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

While the textualists rely on a limited examination of past punishments
in order to support their narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
protections, the contextualists seemingly grant this portrayal of past
punishments even while arguing that other aspects of colonial society
suggest a broader reading of the Eighth Amendment. The first case to
suggest looking beyond a narrow focus on the types of punishments used in
1789 to determine the meaning of the phrase “cruel and unusual” was
Justice Field, dissenting in O’Neil v. State of Vermont.82 He gestured
towards this narrower line of interpretation before arguing that the Eighth
Amendment’s application was not limited to such penalties.83 He argued
“[t]hat designation [cruel and unusual], it is true, is usually applied to
punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the
iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute
pain and suffering.”84 However, while “[s]uch punishments were at one
time inflicted in England,” their use ceased with the adoption of the English
Bill of Rights.85 Justice Field went on to conclude that “[t]he inhibition is
directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but
against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged.”86 In other words, “[t]he
whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail

81

Justice Thomas’s argument also resembles the argument of Michel Foucault in the
way it focuses on a dichotomy between modern and pre-modern penalties. See generally
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977). DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH begins and is in many respects shaped by a similar
dichotomous portrayal of penal form. The work opens with a graphic description of the
drawing and quartering by French authorities of a would-be regicide. Id. at 3–6. Foucault
then contrasts this penalty with the highly regimented (disciplinary) approach taken by
penitentiaries in the early nineteenth century. Id. at 6–7. Foucault has been critiqued for this
periodization, with numerous scholars arguing that penal change occurred earlier than
Foucault suggests and that the process of change was more gradual and less distinct than he
is willing to admit. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 157–62. Justice Thomas is thus
constitutionalizing a dichotomous approach to penal form (modern/pre-modern;
physical/disciplinary) that was suggested by Foucault but that has been closely questioned by
later historians.
82
144 U.S. 323, 337–66 (1892).
83
Id. at 339–40.
84
Id. at 339.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 339–40.
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required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.”87 Justice Field thus
expanded the scope of the Eighth Amendment by turning both to the idea of
penal change, as well as to the concept of proportionality.
Similarly, although Justice White’s dissent in Weems invoked its
origin in the English Bill of Rights to narrowly interpret the Eighth
Amendment, Justice McKenna’s majority opinion in the same case
examined that history, but then broadened the inquiry to consider from what
types of abuse those who advocated the Eighth Amendment sought to
provide protections. He concluded:
[S]urely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out
of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their jealousy of power had a saner justification
than that. They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain
imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by
laws other than those which inflict bodily pain or mutilation. . . . [I]t was believed that
power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to
attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended
to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact repetition of
history. We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised
88
through other forms of punishment was overlooked.

Thus, while Justice McKenna acknowledged a history of penal practice that
contained “exercises of cruelty” and “bodily pain or mutilation,” he invoked
a conception of the Founders as “men of action, practical and sagacious” to
argue that they must have intended the Amendment to encompass
punishments beyond those attributed to the Stuarts.89 At the same time, he
provides little historical evidence or analysis to support his understanding.
Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Furman also considered the concerns
that likely dominated the Framers’ thoughts in determining the scope of the
Eighth Amendment.90 He also traced the Amendment’s origin to the
English Bill of Rights and argued that the document “was concerned
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that
its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe
nature.”91 Similarly, he pointed to abuses of power that were perpetrated
during the years immediately prior to the adoption of the English Bill of
Rights.92 From this history, Justice Douglas argued for an interpretation of
87

Id. at 340.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372–73 (1910). Justice McKenna later stated:
“[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth.” Id. at 373.
89
Id. at 372–73.
90
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
91
Id. at 242.
92
Id. at 246–57. He uses Irving Brant’s The Bill of Rights, its account of the Bloody
88

1. BRAATZ

2016]

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S MILIEU

425

the Eighth Amendment that would prohibit discriminatory applications of
punishments:
Those who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their forebears had paid for
a system based, not on equal justice, but on discrimination. In those days the target
was not the blacks or the poor, but the dissenters, those who opposed absolutism in
government, who struggled for a parliamentary regime, and who opposed
governments’ recurring efforts to foist a particular religion on the people. . . . One
cannot read this history without realizing that the desire for equality was reflected in
the ban against “cruel and unusual punishments” contained in the Eighth
93
Amendment.

Justice Douglas’s opinion, thus focuses on aspects of the historical record
that illuminate who was targeted by particular punishments, though he gives
no attention or analysis to what those punishments were.
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Solem v. Helm94 is another
example of this attempt to use a broader history of the Amendment’s origin
to justify a more expansive interpretation of its application.95 In Solem,
Justice Powell argued that the English Bill of Rights embraced “[t]he
principle that a punishment should be proportionate,” a principle that was
deeply embedded in English constitutional history going back to Magna
Carta.96 By incorporating the language of the English Bill of Rights, the
drafters of the Eighth Amendment “also adopted the English principle of
proportionality” and it was consistently argued that Americans retained “all
the rights of English subjects.”97 Justice Powell, thus opened the historical
record to include previous understandings of appropriate punishment in
England (such as the Magna Carta), along with a broader interpretation of
what the drafters of the Eighth Amendment thought that they were doing
when they adopted language directly from the English Bill of Rights.98
Absent from his opinion, however, was any discussion of past penal
Assizes and the execution of Sidney to support this argument. See BRANT, supra, note 48, at
154–55. For a similar argument, see Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2004).
93
Furman, 408 U.S. at 255.
94
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
95
Id. at 284–86.
96
Id. at 284–85.
97
Id. at 285–86.
98
Id. Justice Scalia’s discussion of history in Harmelin was a direct response to Justice
Powell’s opinion in Solem. He summarizes Solem’s approach to history this way: “Thus not
only is the original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the
circumstances of its enactment, insofar as they display the particular ‘rights of English
subjects’ it was designed to vindicate.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–67 (1991).
Justice Scalia views the extra-textual aspects of the history presented in Solem as irrelevant.
Id. at 967.
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practice and how it may or may not have exhibited a principle of
proportionality.
Thus, while there are examples of justices willing to engage in a more
contextual history of the Eighth Amendment, none of these examples
engage with the history of punishments in England or America, or the
changes these punishments underwent in the early years of the republic.
Rather, they seem to concede the point to the textualists and assume that the
only thing worth knowing about eighteenth-century penal practice is that it
was marked by harshness and cruelty. The next part will demonstrate the
limitations of this approach. In order to have a more complete picture of
how the Founding Generation thought about penal form and its place in the
American republic, it is necessary to look beyond a narrow list of outmoded
punishments and examine the entire system of punishments and how they
were shifting in America during the decade following the Revolution.
II. HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PENAL CHANGE
This Part traces the three most significant state-level experiments in
penal reform that occurred in the decade following the end of the American
Revolution. Although debates over reform of the colonial penal system
began in the years leading up to the Revolution, that event gave new
impetus and significance to the discussion.99 In the years following the
Revolution, the colonial penal codes would undergo significant
transformation. The examples examined in this Part of these changes are
significant for a number of reasons. First, the states involved were leaders
among the American colonies, as measured by population, economic
strength and sources of Founding Fathers. Second, their experiments with
penal change were most developed, but they were also representative of
reforms that were occurring elsewhere. Third, the experiments of each of
these three states served as examples to other states that later attempted
similar reforms. Thus, while focus is on these three states, broader trends,
practices or experiments elsewhere will be mentioned where relevant.
The first example is actually a failed attempt at reform: Thomas
Jefferson’s proposal for a reformed penal code in Virginia. Although this
legislation never actually came into effect, debates over some of its more
99
REBECCA MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 19 (2008). But see ADAM HIRSCH,
THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA 47–56 (1992)
(arguing that the impact of revolutionary ideology on penal change is more ambiguous than
this statement suggests and finding the intellectual antecedents for incarceration in the
workhouse and changes occurring in society to be more directly relevant to shifts in penal
form that followed the Revolution).
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controversial provisions capture many of the larger debates over penal
reform that were occurring in the colonies and in Europe.100 The second
focuses on Massachusetts and its attempt at implementing incarceration as
an alternative penalty to either death or public, physical chastisement. The
third examines Pennsylvania and its experiment with public hard labor,
which was quickly abandoned in favor of incarceration. In each, there was
vigorous debate over how to reform British penal practice in the new
republic (even while the need to reform was largely taken for granted) as
Americans began to “redraw[] the political and moral grounds of possibility
in the arena of punishment.”101 Moreover, each is representative of
discussions and changes occurring elsewhere in the world.102 This broader
context will be examined in each section as relevant in order to situate the
experiments in penal reform that were occurring in the American colonies
with intellectual and cultural debates occurring in Europe at that time. It is
only by examining this process of actual penal change that we can begin to
understand how the Founding Generation thought about penal reform and
how particular punishments might be evaluated as cruel and unusual.
Examining penal reform in the early republic indicates that the
determination of what punishments were acceptable was a process
involving experimentation with new approaches to punishment, rather than
a fixed state of affairs.
A. VIRGINIA: THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND DECREASES IN VIOLENCE

Although the example of Virginia represents a failed attempt at reform,
the attempt itself and potential reasons for its failure demonstrate the extent
of the perceived need for reform, the relevance of Enlightenment thinkers
(especially the work of Cesare Beccaria) in attempts to fashion a new penal
system, as well as some of the long-term changes in sensibilities regarding
100

Jefferson himself raised concerns regarding these portions of the bill. Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Nov. 1 1778), FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0086 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). Later,
Jefferson wrote of the bill’s reception in Europe and the concerns raised by the lex talionis
portions of the bill. Katheryn Preyer, Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers, in
BLACKSTONE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 69 (Mary Sarah Bilder et
al., eds. 2009).
101
Id. at 18.
102
See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1850 44–79 (1978) (discussing debates over and changes in
penal form in England starting in the mid-eighteenth century). See generally PIETER
SPIERENBERG, THE PRISON EXPERIENCE: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INMATES IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1991) (arguing that there was a long-term gradual shift from public
physical punishments to imprisonment throughout Europe beginning in the sixteenth
century).
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interpersonal and physical violence that impacted how leaders sought to
shape both society and the government’s response to criminal acts among
its population. The proposed reform of the criminal law in Virginia thus
demonstrates the salience of many of the underlying trends and ways of
thinking that would impact penal reform elsewhere in the colonies,
including the push towards reducing capital codes, advocating
proportionality in sentencing, and increasing discomfort with public,
physical violence.
Following the Declaration of Independence in 1776, Virginians
Thomas Jefferson, George Wythe, and Edmund Pendleton proposed a range
of revised laws for their state.103 Jefferson was responsible for drafting the
criminal law portion of these revisions and his resulting, “Bill for
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital,” was
completed in 1779.104 However, the legislature delayed considering the bill
until 1785.105
The bill embraced a notion of proportionality in punishment and
declared that each member of society deserved “a punishment in proportion
to his offence” and protection from any “greater pain, so that it becomes a
duty in the legislature to arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may
be necessary for them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding
gradation of punishments.”106 It limited the infliction of capital punishment
by hanging to cases of treason and murder.107
103

Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary
Virginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 56 (1983).
104
Id. at 56–57.
105
Id. at 68.
106
64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital,
18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-0202-0132-0004-0064 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). The preamble also states various objections
to capital punishment including: that “reformation of offenders” should be a goal of
punishment; that “exterminate[ion] . . . of their fellow citizens . . . weakens the state by
cutting off so many who, if reformed, might be restored sound members to society,” or,
whose labors while in prison might be useful to or whose example might prove a deterrence
to other criminals. Id. The bill also argues that “cruel and sanguinary laws defeat their own
purpose” because people feel reluctant to prosecute or convict knowing the outcome could
be death. Id.
107
Id. There was some limited variation in how executions would be carried out
depending on the type of crime. While the typical execution form would be hanging, three
additional penalties of death were proscribed: for petty treason (a servant killing his or her
master) or murder within a family (husband and wife or parent and child) hanging was to be
the penalty with dissection following; for cases of murder by poison, death by poison was to
be the penalty and in cases of dueling, the penalty was to be death by hanging, with the body
of the challenger gibbeted following death. Execution was to be swift (the next day, unless
the next day be Sunday, in which case “on the Monday following”) and both pardons and
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Hard labor “in the public works” became the penalty for a number of
formerly capital cases including: manslaughter, counterfeiting, arson,
willful destruction of ships or their contents, robbery, burglary,
housebreaking, horse stealing, grand larceny, petty larceny, robbery or
larceny of bonds, or other obligatory notes, and buying and receiving stolen
goods.108 Physical punishments remained for a number of offenses,
however, including: rape, polygamy or sodomy, which were to be punished
by castration if committed by a man or “if a woman, by cutting thro’ the
cartilage of her nose a hole of one half inch diameter at the least;” and
maiming or disfigurement, which would result in the offender being
“maimed or disfigured in like sort: or if that cannot be for want of the same
part, then as nearly as may be in some other part of at least equal value and
estimation in the opinion of a jury.”109 In addition to the above penalties, the
bill provided for various types of forfeiture of property and or restitution to
either the victim, the victim’s family, or the Commonwealth.110
Scholars examining Jefferson and his works have tended to accord
little importance to this bill, focusing on its reduction in capital crimes and
deeming its more directly retributive features as “shocking lapses from
humane and liberal standards” in an overall humanitarian piece of
legislation.111 There is a tendency to attempt to disaggregate the modern or
humane aspects of the bill from the backwards-looking “alarming chinks in
its humanity.”112 This treatment begs the question, however, of which
aspects are “humane” and which the “shocking lapses.” In tracing these
two aspects of the law we can begin to see the transformations that penal
law in the new republic was soon to undergo.
Although the bill had numerous influences,113 one of the most
prominent was Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and
Punishment was first published in 1764.114 Among the better-known

privilege of clergy were abolished. Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 125
(1970); Preyer, supra note 103, at 57 n.16.
112
PETERSON, supra note 111, at 126.
113
All excellently traced by Kathryn Preyer. See Preyer, supra note 103, at 61–68.
114
Richard Bellamy, Chronology, in BECCARIA: ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND
OTHER WRITINGS xxxi (Richard Bellamy, ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Political
Thought 2000). Montesquieu also argued for a need to revise criminal laws and asserted that
“terror and severe punishments are only necessary in ‘despotic government.’ In ‘moderate
states,’ severe punishment is unnecessary. ‘Civil laws will make corrections more easily and
will not need as much force.’” RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW:
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aspects of Beccaria’s work are his calls for strict proportionality in
punishments,115 their swift application,116 and an end to the death penalty.117
By the 1770s, this work was widely available in the American colonies.118
Beccaria was one of a handful of Enlightenment thinkers that everyone,
loyalist and patriots, could agree on.119 His significance can be seen in part,
in his ubiquitous presence in the libraries and writings of the Founders.120
In Jefferson’s bill, one can find numerous instances of Beccaria’s
influence. The basic principle it attempts to embrace, that punishments
should be proportional, is clearly an influence from Beccaria as is its goal to
reduce the number of crimes that are capital. Beccaria’s approach can also
be seen in the call for swift application of punishments and the abolition of
privilege of clergy and pardons. At the same time, nothing in Beccaria’s
work called for such a close approximation between crime and punishment
as Jefferson’s bill demonstrated in its more retributive, lex talionis,
provisions, and it was these aspects of the bill that raised concerns at the
time. In submitting the bill to George Wythe, Jefferson himself expressed
the concern that:

PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 78 (2000). See generally
David W. Carrithers, Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Punishment, 19(2) HIST. POL. THOUGHT
213 (1998).
115
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 19 (Richard
Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, trans. 1995) (1764).
It is in the common interest not only that crimes not be committed, but that they be rarer in
proportion to the harm they do to society. Hence the obstacles which repel men from committing
crimes ought to be made stronger the more those crimes are against the public good and the more
inducements there are for committing them. Hence, there must be proportion between crimes and
punishments.

Id.
116
Id. at 48. “The swifter and closer to the crime a punishment is, the juster and more
useful it will be.”
117
Id. at 66–72.
118
Preyer, supra note 100, at 242.
119
BAILYN, supra, note 9, at 28–29.
120
To cite but a few examples: George Washington ordered a copy of his work in 1769,
as did Jefferson, who copied extensive passages into his Commonplace Book. Preyer, supra
note 100, at 241–42; see also BESSLER, supra note 1, at 50. John Adams quoted from
Beccaria in his diary in June 1770, and later used that quote in his opening statement in
defense of the British soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials. Preyer, supra note 100, at 242.
James Wilson and Benjamin Rush, both of Pennsylvania (and both signers of the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution) frequently embraced Beccarian arguments. BESSLER,
supra note 1, at, 51–53. Three state constitutions, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New
Hampshire, embraced Beccarian notions of proportionality. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 38; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, art. XL; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XVIII.
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The lex talionis, altho’ a restitution of the Common law, to the simplicity of which we
have generally found it so advantageous to return will be revolting to the humanised
feelings of modern times. An eye for an eye, and a hand for a hand will exhibit
spectacles in execution whose moral effect would be questionable. . . . This needs
121
reconsideration.

Writing from France following the Revolution, Jefferson contrasted the
praise given to Virginia’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom with the
criticism the “principle of retaliation” in the proposed revised criminal code
had received.122
The “eye for an eye” approach towards crimes involving interpersonal
violence thus seems out of tune with broader trends towards feelings of
discomfort with public, physical chastisement.123 One explanation for the
perceived need for these provisions can perhaps be found in the fact that
during the eighteenth century in Virginia, there seems to have been a high
number of assaults, as indicated in the civil records in suits for damages.124
The Virginia Assembly attempted in 1752, and again in 1772, to impose
criminal prosecutions in these cases.125 Preyer argues that “[a] high degree
of individual aggression constituted one of the chief aspects of Virginia
culture and was shared among all classes of society in much the same
fashion as gambling, racing, cockfighting or other turbulent
amusements.”126 Assuming this to be true,127 then the reasons for including
the lex talionis provisions that appear to be the most anachronistic may in
fact have a modern bent.
This interpretation is further supported by the extensive evidence of a
121

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Nov. 1 1778), FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0086 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
122
Preyer, supra note 100, at 69.
123
I am setting aside for the moment a debate over whether these were actual feelings
that were shifting or rather class-based expressions of feeling used to distinguish one group
(typically described as aristocratic) from another (the common crowd). Compare V.A.C.
GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770–1868, at 12, 24–
25 (1994), with Randall McGowen, Revisiting the Hanging Tree: Gatrell on Emotion and
History, 40 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1, passim (2000). What matters for the argument here
is that the people evaluating the bill, both in Virginia and in France, found those aspects of
the bill to be its most troubling, reflecting long-term trends towards discomfort with public,
physical violence.
124
Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 326, 342 (1982).
125
Id. The act in 1752 passed and made “malicious wounding and maiming a felony
without benefit of clergy,” however, the measure in 1772 dealt with the same offense but
failed to pass. Id.
126
Preyer, supra note 103, at 81.
127
Preyer notes that it is difficult to make definitive statements because the trial court
records for much of this period were burned during the Civil War in 1865. Id. at 70.
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long-term decrease in interpersonal violence in Western Europe that began
by at least the seventeenth century.128 For example, J.M. Beattie points to a
long-term decrease in the homicide rate in England between 1660 and
1800.129 Beattie links this change in the murder and manslaughter rates
with broader changes in society that revealed a “growing antipathy toward
cruelty and extreme physical violence.”130 There is no study comparable in
breadth or depth of colonial America.131 However, if Beattie is correct that
128

BEATTIE, supra, note 14, at 111–12. See generally NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING
PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC INVESTIGATIONS (Eric Dunning, et al. ed.,
Edmund Jephcott trans., 2000); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2012).
129
BEATTIE, supra note 14, at 111–12. He argues that there was a reduction in the
. . . number of deaths in quarrels, of murder in the furtherance of robbery, and of deliberate and
planned killing. Men and women would seem to have become more controlled, less likely to
strike out when annoyed or challenged, less likely to settle an argument or assert their will by
recourse to a knife or their fists, a pistol, or a sword. . . . This supposes a developing civility,
expressed perhaps in a more highly developed politeness of manner and a concern not to offend
or to take offense, and an enlarged sensitivity toward some forms of cruelty and pain.

Id. He argues that this suggests that changes in sensibilities were not simply occurring at the
level of elites but that it had trickled down to “at least the broad ranks of the artisans,
tradesmen, and shopkeepers.” Id. at 112.
130
Id. at 135.
One can see that on one level in the growing hostility toward violent sports, particularly blood
sports like bull-baiting and throwing at cocks, and cruelty to animals in general. There are signs
of that before 1750, but it was particularly strong in the last two decades of the eighteenth
century and into the nineteenth. This was surely linked in turn with the more broadly developing
sentiment antipathetic to cruelty of other kinds that helped to encourage opposition to the slave
trade or support for prison reform or the abolition of capital punishment, all of which emerged
toward the end of the century.

Id. at 135–136. He further connects this to changes in domestic and family relations, where
acceptable methods of discipline and control within the family shifted.
These broadly changing ideas about violence, within the family and without, are reflected in
stiffening penalties imposed by the courts after the middle of the eighteenth century for wifebeating and the abuse of children, and in the increasing willingness of the courts to establish
clearer criminal responsibility in deaths caused by accidents and other manslaughter. Such
charges proceeded not in response to legislation, but from a shift in attitude on the part of jurors
and judges and from what was at bottom a growing hostility towards forms of physical violence
that had been readily accepted a hundred years earlier.

Id. at 136. For another example of this type of argument, see generally PINKER, supra
note 128.
131
Linda Kealey notes that levels of personal violence were “fairly consistent,” in the
second half of the eighteenth century in Massachusetts. Linda Kealey, Patterns of
Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 163, 169
(1986). Other sources indicate that in Massachusetts, the level of personal violence was
always low. See, e.g., EDWIN POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS
1620–1692, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 400–23 (1966); David H. Flaherty, Crime and Social
Control in Provincial Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 339, 342–43 (1981); Preyer, supra note
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there was a long-term process of decreasing acceptance of interpersonal
violence, then aspects of Jefferson’s bill take on a slightly different cast. As
Preyer notes, “[i]t is significant that in Jefferson’s bill all penalties for
offenses against the person were extremely severe—castration for rape, for
example. Apparently the revisors believed that these crimes constituted a
greater threat to the social fabric of the new Commonwealth than crimes
against property.”132 These offenses in which individuals committed acts of
violence against other people were seen as particularly troubling at a time
when the long-term trend appears to have been towards a diminishing of
precisely these types of violence. Thus, the apparently inhumane aspects of
the bill that imposed harsh penalties in instances of interpersonal violence
were a response to a perception that Virginia may have been falling behind
modern society in its decreasing acceptance of acts of interpersonal
violence.
A final modern aspect of the bill was its call for hard labor to replace
capital punishment for most offenses.133 The bill was accompanied by
another one that provided for the creation of a penitentiary.134 Although, as
we will see, Massachusetts was about to start an experiment with
incarceration, this bill would have led to the creation of the first specially
constructed penitentiary in the colonies.135 Indeed, Jefferson sent a model
for this penitentiary from France to officials in Virginia.136
Although the bill did not come up for a vote during the Revolution,
Jefferson was able to enact some of its provisions while he was governor of
Virginia from June 1779 to June 1781.137 During this time, he “pardoned
felons convicted of capital crimes on condition that they work for a term of
years on a variety of public works—generally the lead mines.”138 This
practice was followed by subsequent governors “until 1785 when the Court
of Appeals determined that conditions attached to pardons were

124, at 342–43. See generally EDGAR J. MCMANUS, LAW AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW
ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS, 1620–1692 (1993).
132
Preyer, supra, note 103, at 68.
133
64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital,
18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-0202-0132-0004-0064 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
134
68. A Bill for the Employment, Government and Support of Malefactors Condemned
to Labour for the Commonwealth, 18 June 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0068 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
135
See id.
136
Preyer, supra note 103, at 78–79.
137
Id. at 68.
138
Id.
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unconstitutional.”139
When the bill finally came up for a vote, Jefferson was in Paris as
Minister to the French court.140 In conveying news of the bill’s demise by
one vote in 1787, Madison stated that “‘[o]ur old bloody code141 is by this
event fully restored.’”142 Virginia did achieve a revised criminal code with
a marked reduction in capital crimes in 1796.143
In Jefferson’s proposed revised criminal code, we thus see the modern
impulse towards reduction in capital codes, proportionality in sentencing,
and a concern with reducing Virginia’s troubled history of interpersonal
violence. At the same time, the response of Jefferson and his European
interlocutors to the physical punishments called for in some of the
provisions reveal changing attitudes towards punishments directly imposed
on the body of the condemned.
B. MASSACHUSETTS: REPUBLICANISM AND THE BLOODY CODE

While the example of Virginia reveals changing attitudes towards
violence and physical punishments, the experiment in Massachusetts with
an alternative to capital punishment demonstrates how those changes
impacted the goals the Founders had for the new governments. They
believed that a republican form of government would be distinguished from
monarchical ones, in part, in the different forms of punishment that it
embraced.144 Extensive use of capital codes was seen as not only
unenlightened, but also monarchical and un-republican.
While Virginia was debating an extensive revision to its criminal
codes, which would have entailed embracing a new form of punishment in
the form of a penitentiary, Massachusetts was embarking on a more modest
yet similar reform of penal practice. In 1785, Massachusetts became the
first state after independence to adopt incarceration in a prison as a potential

139

Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69.
141
See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the significance of the term “Bloody Code.”
142
Preyer, supra note 103, at 69 (quoting Madison to Jefferson (Feb. 15, 1787)).
Madison attributed the failure of the bill to a rage against horse stealers. Id.
143
Id. at 76.
144
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 51; see also STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC:
POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 138–64 (2010);
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 18–23. Hirsch notes, however, that republicanism cut two
ways because it simultaneously raised concerns regarding the fragility of that type of
government and over the threat individualism and corruption posed to the new government.
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 51. But see MASUR, supra note 14, at 60 for an argument that the
high crime rate merely heightened the desire for a reformed criminal code.
140
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criminal penalty.145 Castle Island, “a fortress guarding Boston harbor,” was
appointed for this purpose and was to receive individuals sentenced
throughout the state.146 The Castle Island Act emerged out of a commission
that was to consider revisions to the colonial law code more generally.147
These types of commissions were common in the colonies during and
following the Revolution (Jefferson’s bill was itself part of this
movement).148 Among other changes the commission introduced were
more narrow definitions of certain capital crimes such as burglary, robbery,
and arson, as well as a reduction in the number of capital offenses with time
spent at hard labor being used as a substitute.149 Within Castle Island, the
prisoners “lived under military-like discipline,” were to be kept at “fatigue
work” and wore matching uniforms.150
Attempts to explain why imprisonment arose as an alternative
punishment in Massachusetts at this time demonstrate the complexity of
finding causal explanations for penal reform. At the same time, an
examination of the debates surrounding penal reform in general, and the
need to find an alternative to the death penalty in particular, occurring both
in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the colonies, demonstrates the relevance
of those debates to the overall project of constructing republican
governance in the new nation. References to Beccaria were most
noteworthy for indicating a desire for penal reform, rather than the specific
content of that reform.151 Although other distinguished jurists such as
William Blackstone and William Eden embraced his philosophies, none of
them provided a theory of penal practice that could be adopted by the
American states.152 Instead, they focused on the problems of sanguinary or
cruel criminal codes without indicating what a more enlightened code
would look like.153 Thus, while the ubiquitous references to Beccaria should
then be taken as a measure of the perceived need for criminal law reform,
rather than as a set of precepts for what form reformed punishment would
take, references to that thinker did frequently entail a critique of the
extensive use of capital punishment.

145

Id. at 11.
Id.
147
Id. at 47.
148
See id.
149
Linda Kealey, Punishment at Hard Labor: Stephen Burroughs and the Castle Island
Prison, 1785–1798, 57 NEW ENG. Q. 249, 250–51 (1984).
150
Id. at 251.
151
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 26.
152
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 25.
153
Id.
146
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While Jefferson’s bill proposed an overall reduction in capital crimes,
there was nothing particularly in Beccaria’s thought that suggested the
alternative punishment that Jefferson’s bill proposed: hard labor. Hard
labor was a penalty that had been proposed at various times during the
previous two centuries, both in England and in the colonies but never really
implemented as a punishment for the more serious categories of crime.154
“Workhouses” or “houses of correction” were constructed in England
starting in the sixteenth century to address a perceived problem with
vagrancy.155 Their inhabitants were not those charged with more serious
crime such as burglary, rather they have been described as: “[u]nruly
apprentices, sturdy beggars, strumpets, vagrants and rogues.”156 The goal
of the workhouse was to replace idleness with industry by forcing the
vagrant to work.157
Because there was this goal of reformation,
“conscientious management of the institution became “essential” and in
order to “protect the integrity of the workhouse’s rehabilitative routine,
authorities provided codes of regulations for its orderly government, which
was monitored by the local justice of the peace.”158 Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and New York all had workhouses by the early eighteenth
century.159 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were
serious proposals in England and the colonies to introduce hard labor as a
penalty for criminals.160 For example, Massachusetts passed legislation in
1749 and 1750, prescribing hard labor in the state’s workhouses for those
convicted of extortion and counterfeiting.161 A bill proposed in 1765
154

HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 28.
Id. at 13–14.
156
NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THE CRADLE OF THE PENITENTIARY: THE WALNUT STREET JAIL
AT PHILADELPHIA 1773–1835, at 4 (1955).
157
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 14.
158
Id. at 15. Among which were: “[u]nlike jail keepers, all workhouse officers were to
be ‘fitly qualified’ for their posts. And to ensure that the rehabilitative routine was not
threatened by disease, authorities mandated the first rudimentary hygienic precautions
against the afflictions endemic to other carceral facilities.” Id.
159
Id. at 27. Rothman argues that the workhouses were not a significant aspect of
colonial poor relief, though Hirsch argues persuasively against this interpretation. Compare
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 25–29 (1971), with HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 26–31.
160
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 16–17; see also BEATTIE, supra, note 14, at 492–500 for a
discussion of proposals to use incarceration in houses of correction in early eighteenthcentury England. Beattie argues that transportation ultimately displaced this experiment for
much of the eighteenth century though the idea “re-emerged powerfully in the third quarter
of the century at the heart of a new dominant penal ideology.” Id. at 500. See id. at 520–24
for a proposal to change the punishment for felonies to confinement in hard labor at the dock
yards.
161
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 28.
155
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“would have introduced the punishment comprehensively.”162
Although Pennsylvania implemented hard labor in a house of
correction under Penn’s Law, implemented in 1682, this was done away
with in 1718, and little is known about the actual functioning of that law or
its penal measures.163 The first state to actually introduce hard labor as a
penalty for serious crimes in the eighteenth century was Connecticut.164 In
1773, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a resolution indicating
their desire to find a facility “‘for the purpose of confining, securing and
profitably employing such criminals as may be committed to them by any
future law or laws of this Colony, in lieu of the infamous punishments in
divers cases now appointed.’”165 A group of mines, known as the Simsbury
copper mines, were purchased and secured for this purpose.166 By the end
of that year, individuals found guilty of five kinds of offenses: robbery,
burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, and horse theft could be sentenced to the
prison.167 Prior to the creation of this prison, those guilty of these offenses
would have been subjected to various forms of corporal punishment,
including branding and removal of an ear (first-time burglary offenses) or
execution (third-time burglary offenders).168 The mines were closed in
1782 “for the duration of the hostilities with Britain.”169 Although
legislation was passed in 1783 to construct a more secure facility on the
site, it was not until 1790 that Connecticut opened Newgate as a statewide
prison.170 As was seen above, Jefferson started a similar practice in
Virginia while he was governor during the revolution, but it ended in
162

Id.
ORLANDO LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS,
1776–1845 10 (1922); see also Herbert William Keith Fitzroy, The Punishment of Crime in
Provincial Pennsylvania, 60 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 242 (1936); Lawrence Gipson,
Crime and Its Punishment in Provincial Pennsylvania: A Phase of the Social History of the
Commonwealth, 2 PA. HIST. 3 (1935); William Lloyd, Jr., The Courts of Pennsylvania in the
Eighteenth Century Prior to the Revolution, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1908); Paul Lermack,
Peace Bonds and Criminal Justice in Colonial Philadelphia, 100 PA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 173 (1976); Preyer, supra note 124, at 336; G.S. Rowe, Black Offenders,
Criminal Courts, and Philadelphia Society in the Late Eighteenth-Century, 22 J. SOC. HIST.
685 (1989).
164
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 56; Alexis M. Durham III, Newgate of Connecticut Origins
and Early Days of an Early American Prison, 6 JUST. Q. 89, 90 (1989).
165
Durham, supra note 164, at 90–91 (quoting Public Records of the Colony of
Connecticut May 1773, at 92–93).
166
RICHARD H. PHELPS, A HISTORY OF NEWGATE OF CONNECTICUT 6, 92 (1860).
167
Durham, supra note 164 at 90.
168
Id. at 93.
169
Id. at 101–03.
170
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87; Durham, supra note 164, at 103.
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1785.171
Hirsch argues that the workhouse model, and the ideology of reform
through hard work that it embodied, provided the justifying language and
form for the new Castle Island Act.172 But while the workhouse provided a
model for the structure of the new penalties, there is still the question of
why it was adopted at this time rather than when proposals had been put
forward earlier in the century. There are two related answers to this
question. The first is that colonial society underwent substantial changes in
the second half of the eighteenth century, and the traditional punishments
that had worked in the close-knit colonial towns were breaking down as the
population both grew and became more mobile.173 The second is that the
old punishments were no longer seen as effective, in part because of
changing attitudes towards the relationship between punishment and the
state.174 Hirsch argues that “by the 1780s . . . tracts proposing hard labor
had taken on an alarmist tone, and the emphasis had shifted to a delineation
of the demerits of the prevailing body of sanctions.”175
The traditional punishments of the admonition,176 fines (with sale into
service being their alternative) and public punishments such as whipping,
all depended on a “communal pattern of life.”177 The punishments reflected
the fact of embeddedness within the community: “[t]he usual penalties . . .
did not sever a criminal’s ties with society,” and the penalty with the
longest duration (sale into servitude178) had a “probable effect . . . to
171

See infra Part II.A.
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 31.
173
Id. at 35–36.
174
This is true whether that changing relationship was defined by republicanism,
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 50–53, or by liberalism, MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF
VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835 at 12–16
(1996).
175
Id. at 37. Masur argues that “Americans in post-Revolutionary America believed
that criminal activity raged out of control. . . . This social perception of crime on the loose
intensified the desire to restructure the criminal justice system.” MASUR, supra note 14,
at 59.
176
This involved an appearance by the offender in “open court for a formal admonition
by the magistrate, a public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence,
wholly or partially suspended to symbolize forgiveness.” HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 4.
177
Id. at 4. For a description of colonial penalties, see MCMANUS, supra note 131, at
164–79, 200–10; POWERS, supra note 131, at 163–320; Flaherty, supra note 131, at 349–52;
Kealey, supra note 131, at 171.
178
Preyer, supra note 124, at 343. Individuals were sold into servitude when they were
unable to pay the fine that was the primary penalty. Id. Because property offenses typically
involved triple restitution, a fine in those cases frequently resulted in the offender being sold
into servitude in order to pay off the fine. Id. The incidence of sale into servitude increased
in the 1730s and 1740s, with those in the 1740s receiving comparatively longer terms of
172
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integrate [the convicted] more fully into society by reorienting him toward
normal social contacts.”179 In the second half of the eighteenth century,
however, the population of the state became increasingly transient and
individuals charged with crimes were no longer necessarily integrated
members of the community.180 As a result, the various penalties that made
up the colonial penal code came to be seen as ineffective.181 Sale into
servitude all but stopped, presumably because people were unwilling to take
on a stranger, particularly a criminal stranger, to labor for them.182
Admonition fell away as crimes were increasingly committed by strangers
to the community and a culture of privacy developed that made established
members of the community reluctant to discuss their offenses in public.183
Finally, with regard to public punishments such as whipping or time spent
in the stocks, while the goal had previously been to reintegrate the offender
into the community “when the offender lacked community ties, this formula
no longer applied. In such cases, the purpose of these sanctions shifted to
expulsion, by alerting townspeople to the culprits’ infamy.”184 This resulted
in public punishments administered to strangers that created mutual
antipathy rather than reintegrating the offender into the community.185 One
response was to increase the recourse to capital punishment.186 But this
posed a dilemma, as described by one newspaper: “[a]lthough ‘[a]t present,
our laws are no more a check to simple robbery [than] they are to getting
money honestly,’ the alternative of ‘tak[ing] a man’s life for every trifling
theft, as is done in England, is a disgrace to a civilized nation; humanity
recoils from the idea.’”187
Herein lay the heart of the problem: in America following the
Revolution, traditional sanctions not only came into question because of the
changing nature of society, but because they were seen as a corrupt
inheritance from England.188 During this time, Americans began to refer to
England’s code as “bloody,” “unit[ing] England’s capital statutes into a

service. Id.
179
WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 40 (1975).
180
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 35–36.
181
Id. at 36–39.
182
Id. at 37–38.
183
Id. at 38.
184
Id. at 40.
185
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 39.
186
Id. at 40.
187
Id. at 41 (quoting MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1).
188
Id. at 47–48; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19–23.
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common ‘code’ with bloodshed as its centerpiece.”189 In part, this was a
result of the very large number of offenses that could result in the death
penalty (by 1776 there were nearly 200).190 There were frequent references
in the newspapers to the number of executions in England: “No other
country in the civilized world, it was often stated, had as many executions
as England.”191 Benjamin Rush estimated that from 1688 (the year of the
Glorious Revolution) to 1787, there had been 70,000 executions in
England.192 Recent evidence suggests that his estimate was far from
correct.193 2,000 is a more accurate number, but the fact that he believed the
exaggerated number was accurate underscores perceptions in America of
England’s excessive reliance on the death penalty.194
Criticism of this “Bloody Code” became ubiquitous in the 1780s and
90s, and the extensive capital codes were connected with physical, public
punishments in a category of penalties referred to as “sanguinary.”195
“Critics argued that capital and related sanguinary punishments were
inherently despotic and immoral in nature,” while “[b]loody and ‘excessive’
spectacles of punishment . . . were the native weapons of kings and
despots.”196 While not all of the Founders opposed capital punishment in
all circumstances, they did all associate excessive use of that penalty with
monarchical forms of government.197
This relationship between the perception of England as “Bloody” and
the perceived need for penal reform in the colonies can be seen in a number
189

WILF, supra note 144, at 138.
Id. at 139.
191
Id. at 142.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
WILF, supra note 144, at 142.
195
Id. at 138–54; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 18–19.
196
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19.
197
Id. Benjamin Rush (Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution) and William Bradford (Attorney General under
President Washington) were perhaps the most famous proponents of a complete abolition of
the death penalty at the time, though others indicated support for the cause. BESSLER, supra
note 1, at 66–96. Rothman makes a similar point:
190

Armed with patriotic fervor, sharing a repugnance for things British and a new familiarity with
and faith in Enlightenment doctrines, they posited that the origins and persistence of deviant
behavior would be found in the nature of the colonial criminal codes. Established in the days of
oppression and ignorance, the laws reflected British insistence on severe and cruel punishment.

ROTHMAN, supra note 159, at 59. As does Michael Meranze: “Revolutionary-era reformers
forcefully redefined exemplary punishments as cruel and excessive. They linked the practice
of capital and corporal punishments to the archaisms of tyranny and monarchy.” MERANZE,
supra note 174, at 68.
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of state constitutions calling for a reduction in so-called “sanguinary” laws.
For example, Maryland’s constitution, adopted on November 11, 1776, was
the first to do so with this provision: “[t]hat sanguinary laws ought to be
avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety of the State: and no law, to
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, ought to be made in any case,
or at any time hereafter.”198 Similarly, South Carolina’s constitution of
1778 included a provision: “[t]hat the penal Laws, as heretofore used, shall
be reformed, and Punishments made, in some Cases less sanguinary, and, in
general, more proportionate to the crime.”199 Pennsylvania (1776) and
Vermont (1777) had identical provisions that provided for “punishing by
hard labour” in order to “make sanguinary punishments less necessary.”200
It was thus in marked contrast to the portrayal of England as “Bloody”
that the colonists sought to reform their own criminal laws and these
reforms “served as outward legitimating representations of the American
Revolution” and “[b]y signaling differences with English criminal law,
states were announcing the special character of justice in fledgling
American republics.”201 “A repulsion from the gallows rather than any faith
in the penitentiary spurred the late-eighteenth century construction. . . .
Incarceration seemed more humane than hanging and less brutal than
whipping.”202 There were thus two arguments with regard to the criminal
laws and punishment that were being made. First, there was “a coherent
American critique of what the revolutionaries argued were ‘monarchical’
penal laws and practices,” which led to “a positive republican theory of
crime, penal law, and penal practice.”203 The critique was of a capital code
that was seen to be excessive because it included everything from murder to
198

MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XIV.
S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL.
200
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, § XXIX; VT. CONST. of 1777, art. II, § XXXV; see also
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, § XXXVIII (providing in part that “[t]he penal laws as heretofore
used shall be reformed by the legislature of this state, as soon as may be, and punishments
made in some cases less sanguinary”).
201
WILF, supra note 144, at 146, 148. The focus here is on attempts to use a reformed
criminal law as one marker of the difference between a republican form of government and a
monarchical one. This is not to suggest that similar calls for reform were not also occurring
in England. Michael Ignatieff traces the ideological beginnings of the penitentiary to this
period. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 102, at 44–79. Although V.A.C. Gatrell argues that
English elites were committed to the Bloody Code up until that code became completely
dismantled in the 1830s, Simon Devereaux has recently argued that there were leading
statesmen who were seeking alternatives to capital punishment. Compare GATRELL, supra
note 123, at 20, with Simon Devereaux, Inexperienced Humanitarians? William Wilberforce,
William Pitt, and the Execution Crisis of the 1780s, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 839, 842 (2015).
202
ROTHMAN, supra note 159, at 62.
203
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19.
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petty theft and physical punishments that were directed at the body of the
condemned.204 Criminal law took on political meaning as punishment was
evaluated as being appropriate (or not) to a republican form of
government.205 “A new understanding of criminal law emerged around the
time of the American Revolution. Criminal justice was seen as a mirror
that reflected truths about the surrounding political and social structure,”
and “[p]enal reform created an outward representation of the new republic,
playing much the same role as health care or literacy programs for
twentieth-century revolutions. The political authority of the nascent
republic turned in part upon its remaking of criminal law.”206 Thus, by
rejecting England’s excessive capital code and reliance on punishments
directed at the body of the offender, the American colonies were signaling
to themselves and the rest of the world what it meant to be republican.207
While the rhetoric of the period saw the question of a revised criminal
code as central to the creation of a new type of government, the actual
changes wrought by the Castle Island Act should not be overstated. Under
the new law, hard labor was an option, but not a requirement, and it did not
immediately replace corporal punishment.208 Although a statute was
proposed and passed by the Massachusetts House of Representatives in
1785 making hard labor an alternative in all cases where corporal
punishment was an option, it failed to pass the Senate and corporal
punishment was not officially ended until 1826 (although it had fallen out
of use in the first decade of the nineteenth century).209 Moreover, the
experiment with incarceration as an alternative penalty was short lived.
Castle Island was sold to the federal government in 1789 to be used for

204

Id.
“Many publicists distinguished a republic from a monarchy not only by its liberal
political objectives but also by its lack of a strong state coercive apparatus.” HIRSCH, supra
note 99, at 51. The term “publicist” refers to anyone publishing a political tract. See BAILYN,
supra note 9, at 1–21, for discussion of the political pamphlets that were the source of “much
of the most important and characteristic writing of the American Revolution.” Id. at 2.
206
WILF, supra note 144, at 9–10.
207
In this the American colonists were engaged in a form of self-definition that has a
long and varied history. Guy Geltner has recently argued that the depiction of past or simply
other regimes as relying on brutal physical punishments has been extensively used as a form
of self-definition and a means of claiming cultural superiority. He suggests that this is true
even though corporal punishment continues in use within the new regime, thus rejecting
arguments that there has been a long-term trend towards decreasing reliance on corporal
punishment. See generally GUY GELTNER, FLOGGING OTHERS: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND
CULTURAL IDENTITY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (2015).
208
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 57.
209
Id. at 58.
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military purposes.210 Massachusetts’s next prison, in Charlestown, did not
open until 1799.211 Still, Castle Island was the “first American carceral
institution to achieve international celebrity.”212 Within a year, there was “a
pilot project in the city of New York and . . . a statewide program in
Pennsylvania.”213
C. PENNSYLVANIA: CIVILIZATION AND CHANGING SENSIBILITIES

Rather than follow the lead of Massachusetts and embrace hard labor
within an institutional setting, Pennsylvania first experimented with hard
labor conducted in public.214 The rapid breakdown of this experiment led to
the adoption in 1790 of hard labor within the Walnut Street Prison, which
became famous throughout the new nation and internationally as other
jurisdictions sought examples of more humane punishments.215 The reasons
why hard labor in public ultimately broke down provide the final link in
explaining the content and depth of post-revolutionary penal reform. The
example of Pennsylvania thus demonstrates that the focus of penal reform
was not simply on reducing the infliction of capital punishment, it was also
ultimately focused on reducing the public infliction of physical
chastisements.
The discussion of Massachusetts above reveals that in the postRevolutionary period, Americans defined their republican form of
government, and the reformed penal practice it would entail, in opposition
to England’s Bloody Code. It was not just as a contrast to England’s
“sanguinary” practices that this definition of republican criminal practice
was being defined, however. Frequently in the accounts, references to
bloody codes and sanguinary practices gave way to descriptions of such
penal practices as being savage or barbaric.216 These terms connect penal
reform not just with the creation of a republican government, but also a
more civilized one. This point becomes more apparent in debates over
public punishments in Pennsylvania in the late 1780s.217
References to British penal practices as being “savage” or “barbaric”
210

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11.
212
Id. at xii.
213
Id. at 11.
214
MERANZE, supra note 174, at 55–86.
215
Rex A. Skidmore, Penological Pioneering in the Walnut Street Jail, 1789-1799, 39 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 167–68 (1948).
216
MERANZE, supra note 174, at 70–71.
217
See, e.g., id. at 70–71 (discussing characterizations of capital and corporal
punishments as “unnecessary legacies from unenlightened, barbaric times”).
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were almost as common as references to their Bloody Code.218 For
example, a charge given in 1793 to a Philadelphia grand jury stated: “In
England . . . their books are crowded with penal statutes which appear to
have resulted from the barbarous dictates of revenge.”219
Harsh
punishments with little purpose aside from their harshness were seen by
commentators as exemplary of less developed states: “Amongst unpolished
nations, and during the prevalence of savage manners punishment is the
only means known for preserving public order. . . . When one proves
ineffectual, he thinks of another more rigourous.”220 England’s system of
punishment was described as having been “‘copied from the Goth and the
Vandal.’”221 Rebecca McLennan argues, “[c]onnections were drawn
between British ‘savagery’ on the battlefield and the frequency with which
the courts in England reputedly condemned Englishmen, found guilty of
crimes grand and petty, to swing from the ‘hanging tree.’”222 As an
example, Thomas Paine described British war acts as “contrary to the
practice of all nations but savages,” and later asked “[w]hat sort of men
must Englishmen be . . . ? The history of the most savage Indians does not
produce instances exactly of this kind.’”223 To the Americans, extensive
218

MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19; MERANZE, supra note 174, at 70–71. This equation
between unreformed criminal law and barbarism continued well past this initial focus on
England. When arguing for the need to reform the criminal law in Virginia in 1796 a state
legislator referred to the old code as “barbaric.” WILF, supra note 144, at 140–41; Preyer,
supra note 103, at 77.
219
See, e.g., WILF, supra note 144, at 140.
220
MERANZE, supra note 174, at 70–71 (quoting An Essay on Capital Punishment, in
FREEMEN’S JOURNAL, Sept. 7, 1785).
221
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 48. Masur also found critiques of British “barbaric
behavior.” He argues that “many Americans believed in ‘the barbarity of our oppresors’ and
were horrified at repeated examples of ‘inhuman and worse than savage cruelty’ by the
British.” MASUR, supra note 14, at 55. He also quotes Abigail Adams referring to the
British as “our Barbarous foes” who “let loose the infernal savages.’” Id. In April 1777, “a
committee appointed by Congress reported its findings on the conduct of British soldiers and
found,” inter alia, “savage butchery.” Id. at 56. Referring to the execution of a militia
member captured by loyalists, Thomas Paine wrote “‘as far as our knowledge goes there is
not a more detestable character, nor a meaner or more barbarous enemy than the present
British one. . . . [The execution] is an original in the history of civilized barbarians, and is
truly British.’” Id. Washington referred to the same execution as “‘the most wanton,
unprecedented and unhuman Murder that ever disgraced the arms of a civilized people.’” Id.
at 57. In response to a proposal that the American troops execute one of their own prisoners
of war in response, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “so solemn and deliberate a sacrifice of
the innocent for the guilty must be condemned on the present received notions of humanity,
and encourage an opinion that we are in a certain degree in a state o[f] barbarism.” Id. at 58.
222
MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 19 (quoting MASUR, supra note 14, at 19).
223
Id. at n.12 (quoting A Supernumerary Crisis, To Sir Guy Carleton, in CRISIS PAPERS,
Philadelphia, May 31, 1782).
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use of capital punishment was “central to the organization of English
society” and “England was portrayed in much the same way as Blackstone
depicted primitive societies.”224 For example, one American essayist
referred to the executed as “human sacrifices” that were “yearly offered
up.”225
This discussion provides important context for understanding the
content of the reformed republican criminal law that was being embraced
throughout the colonies. By the late eighteenth century, the word
“civilization” was beginning to take root.226 The first use of this term has
been traced to Victor Riqueti Mirabeau in his work L’Ami des hommes.227
The term, as used by Mirabeau, “referred . . . to a group of people who were
polished, refined, and mannered, as well as virtuous in their social
existence.”228 Within a short period of time, “the designation had swept
over Europe and become commonplace in Enlightenment thought” and it
“formed part of the idea of progress and became the third phase in
conjectural history, signaling the last stage in the movement of humanity
from savagery to barbarism and then to civilization.”229 While civilization
represented a particular conception of evolutionary, progressive change, its
content—that is to say, what it meant to be a civilized state—focused on
defining what the bonds or connections were between members of
society.230 For some, this meant a focus on manners or mores “as lying at
the center of sociability,” while elsewhere emerging at the same time is a
focus on the “public sphere,” the “social,” “social contract,” etc., all of
which are “part of an effort to describe, understand, and project new forms

224

WILF, supra note 144, at 141.
Id. It should be noted that this does not mean that objectively the American colonists
were less brutal than the British. Masur argues that “Americans . . . viewed themselves as
the virtuous and humane citizens of a new nation,” while portraying the British as “debased
and barbarous.” MASUR, supra note 14, at 57. At the same time, “[i]n actuality, patriots
executed offenders as frequently and as barbarously as their enemies.” Id. at 58. Thus, it is
not about a factual difference between the British and the Americans, rather is was about
making a claim to cultural superiority on the part of the Americans. See generally GELTNER,
supra note 207.
226
BRUCE MAZLISH, CIVILIZATION AND ITS CONTENTS 5 (2004).
227
Id. We know that at least Jefferson and Madison were familiar with this work. See
From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, with a List of Books 1 September 1785,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0360 (last
visited Sept. 4, 2016) (including Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes among a list of books
Jefferson had purchased for and was sending to Madison).
228
MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 7.
229
Id. at 7–8.
230
Id. at 8–11. See generally ELIAS, supra note 128.
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of social bonding.”231
Gordon Wood has pointed to this particular problem following the
American Revolution: if the previous methods of holding society together
(largely hierarchical in which everyone knew their place) were falling apart
in a new republican government that assumed equality between all men,
then what were to be the bonds that held society together?232 The Founders
believed in their ability to shape a new society.233 Part of how they set
about achieving that new society depended on their belief that “people were
not born to be what they might become.”234 Lockean theory argued that
people were shaped by their sensations and the mind, according to John
Adams, “could be cultivated like a garden, with barbarous weeds eliminated
and enlightened fruits raised, ‘the savages destroyed, . . . the civil People
increased.’”235 This meant the “pushing back of darkness and what was
called Gothic barbarism,” which took place on many fronts.236 Ultimately,
all of these changes were connected to the concept of civilization.237 While
civilization as a concept has been linked to changes in the material
prosperity of a people:
It was above all a matter of personal and social morality, of the ways in which men
and women treated each other, their children, their dependents, even their animals.
Such enlightened morality lay at the heart of republicanism. Americans thought
themselves more civilized and humane than the British precisely because they had
adopted republican governments, which as Benjamin Rush said, were “peaceful and
benevolent forms of government” requiring “mild and benevolent principles.” With
the Revolution they sought to express these mild and benevolent principles in a
variety of reforms—most notably perhaps in their new systems of criminal
238
punishment.

Herein lies the heart of the matter: the changes sought to create a more
virtuous citizenry—one that was required for civilization to flourish—
would be pursued in no small part by implementing a reformed criminal
code.
But what change in the criminal code would lead to this transformation
231

MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 10–12.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 189 (1991).
Elsewhere he describes that a struggle “to find new attachments befitting a republican
people . . . they sought enlightened connections to hold their new popular societies together.”
Id. at ix.
233
Id. at 190.
234
Id.
235
Id. (quoting John Adams to Jonathan Sewell (Feb. 1760)).
236
Id. at 191.
237
Id. at 192.
238
WOOD, supra note 232, at 192.
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in the citizenry? To understand this problem, we need to more closely
examine Pennsylvania’s experiment with public labor.239 The changes
wrought in Pennsylvania’s penal practice were the most far reaching of the
penal reforms attempted in the 1780s, and they foreshadowed much of the
changes that other states would pursue in the 1790s. The first indication of
the sweeping changes to come can be found in Pennsylvania’s first state
constitution, adopted in 1776. It provided that:
To deter more effectually from the commission of crimes, by continued visible
punishments of long duration, and to make sanguinary punishments less necessary;
houses ought to be provided for punishing by hard labour, those who shall be
convicted of crimes not capital; wherein the criminals shall be employed for the
benefit of the public, or for reparation of injuries done to private persons. And all
240
persons at proper times shall be admitted to see the prisoners at their labour.

It was not until 1786 that legislation was passed to give effect to this
provision. In that year an act was passed that called for “continued hard
labor, publicly and disgracefully imposed . . . in streets of cities and towns,
and upon the highways of the open country and other public works.”241 The
act also reduced the number of capital crimes (robbery, burglary and
sodomy were removed) and replaced whipping and other public
punishments with hard labor.242 By replacing whipping and some capital
punishments, the system of public labor “greatly reduced reliance on
sanguinary penalties” at the same time that it “would turn convicts into
constant reminders of the penalties of vice.”243 Thus, Pennsylvania sought
to retain the benefits of public punishment and the visibility of the
condemned minus the problematic aspects of physical punishments aimed
at the body of the convict.244
239

Other states experimented with public labor, for example a public labor act passed in
Rhode Island. MCLENNAN, supra, note 99, at 33 n.63. New York also started a pilot project
in New York City in 1785. HIRSCH, supra, note 99, at 25. Under the project, hard labor was
to occur in an existing workhouse, though apparently, it was in reality performed on public
works in the city. Id. Incarceration at hard labor was not expanded statewide in New York
until 1796. Id. at 11 n.87.
240
PA. CONST. of 1776, §39. Vermont’s Constitution, adopted in 1777, contained an
almost identical provision. VT. CONST. of 1777, art. II, § XXXV.
241
Thorsten Sellin, Philadelphia Prisons of the Eighteenth Century, 43 TRANS. AM.
PHIL. SOC’Y 326, 327 (1953); MERANZE, supra note 174, at 21–22.
242
MERANZE, supra note 174, at 79.
243
Id. at 55.
244
Merenze, like Hirsch, attributes the driving force for penal reform to rising fears of
criminality, even while the ideology behind that reform was expressed in terms of
“‘enlightened’ moderation. Id. at 67. To acknowledge that there were forces other than the
purely ideological that helped push forward penal reform is not to diminish the significance
of the ideological. As David Garland argues, penal form is always over determined and
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From the beginning, the program of public labor was beset by
problems. The prisoners wore a ball and chain while they went about their
work, and sometimes used this to injure passersby.245 Their cloths were
specially designed to bring attention, described as: “‘A parti-colored
scheme. . . . The roundabout would have sleeves of different colors, as for
example, red and green, black and white, or blue and yellow. The legs of
the pantaloons were also of different colors.’”246 There were complaints
that the prisoners engaged in theft while at their public labor, and escapes
were frequent.247
Aside from the complaints regarding the problems of public safety and
maintaining the prisoners at hard labor, a deeper complaint was made by
Dr. Benjamin Rush. Rush was a signer of both the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.248 A prominent member of Philadelphia
Society, he took a particular interest in penal reform.249 Rush presented a
paper at the home of Benjamin Franklin in 1787 criticizing public
punishments in general.250 In it he argued that they “end to make bad men
worse, and to increase crimes, by their influence upon society . . . it is
always connected with infamy, it destroys in the criminal the sense of
shame which is one of the strongest outposts of virtue.”251 He concluded by
arguing that “‘I cannot help entertaining the hope that the time is not very
far distant when the gallows, the pillory, the stocks, the whipping post and
the wheelbarrow (the usual engines of public punishments) will be
connected with the history of the rack, and the stake, as marks of barbarity
of ages and countries.’”252
At the same time that this experiment was occurring in Philadelphia,
the Constitutional Convention was convening there to draft a new
Constitution.253 The Walnut Street Jail was located just across the street
from the state house where the Convention was held: “Outside the walls of
there will generally be multiple explanations for a given outcome. GARLAND, supra note 16,
at 280–81 (1990).
245
TEETERS, supra note 156, at 27.
246
Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
247
Id.
248
BESSLER, supra note 1, at 53.
249
Id. at 66.
250
Id. at 69.
251
BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON
CRIMINALS AND UPON SOCIETY 4 (1787) (reprinted in Reform of Criminal Law in
Pennsylvania (Morton Horowitz & Stanley Katz eds., 1972)).
252
Id. at 18.
253
See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (1986).
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the state house, the prisoners at the Walnut Street Jail—in close proximity
to the Convention proceedings, and cursing anyone who ignored them—
thrust long poles with cloth caps on the ends through the prison’s barred
windows, seeking alms.”254
Pennsylvania’s negative experience with public labor had an impact
throughout the colonies. For example, “[a]lthough he had earlier proposed
public hard labor for prisoners, Jefferson wrote that by 1786 the
Pennsylvania experience with the wheelbarrow laws had changed his
mind.”255 Later in his autobiography, he recounted: “Exhibited as a public
spectacle, with shaved heads and mean clothing, working on the high roads,
produced in the criminals such a prostration of character, such an
abandonment of self-respect, as, instead of reforming, plunged them into
the most desperate and hardened depravity of morals and character.”256
This same breakdown in public punishments could be seen in other
states. For example, in Massachusetts, “[a] culture of privacy” led to the
breakdown of admonition as a penalty as offenders were no longer willing
to provide public confessions of wrongdoing.257 Similarly, public
punishments began to involve scenes of disorder: “Such sessions also
became increasingly tumultuous affairs, in which offenders were liable to
be pelted with refuse or worse. Onlookers appear to have seized the
occasions of public punishment to vent their frustration over crime, in the
process creating scenes of chaos that would have been unheard of when
they shared with offenders a sense of belonging to the same community.”258
In Rush’s writings, we see a changing reaction to the site of physical
suffering while in these scenes of public disorder surrounding public
inflictions of punishment, we see officials’ increasing concern that the
public was not reacting in the “correct” way to the punishments.259
Meranze refers to the problem posed by public punishments as “mimetic
corruption,” meaning that the message that officials intended to convey
failed.260 The response of Dr. Rush and other Founders to sites of suffering
suggest an even deeper problem, however. The problem posed by public
254
Id. at 114. See also Simon P. Newman & Billy G. Smith, Incarcerated Innocents:
Inmates, Conditions, and Survival Strategies in Philadelphia’s Almshouse and Jail, in
BURIED LIVES: INCARCERATION IN EARLY AMERICA 60, 60 (Michele Lise Tarter et al. eds.,
2012).
255
PESTRITTO, supra note 114115, at 123.
256
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743–1790, at 72
(1821).
257
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 38.
258
Id. at 40.
259
See generally RUSH, supra note 251.
260
MERANZE, supra note 174, at 87–88.
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punishments and what officials sought to control was the emotional
connection to the convicted criminal.261 Too much identification and the
system of justice was subverted, but too little identification and the social
bonds of moral sense that hold the community together would be threatened
as well.
This change in the individual emotional reaction to violence, the body
and physical pain has been termed “sensibilities.”262 We already saw some
influence of these changing sensibilities in the reaction to Jefferson’s Crime
Bill (and suggested another influence in the evident concern the bill
demonstrated with the problem of interpersonal violence).263 Here, it is
evident again in the reactions of elites themselves to scenes of suffering, in
their reaction to the problems of crowds, and their behavior during public
punishments. The public punishment is seen as brutalizing the sensibilities
of those that observe it. There is some debate among historians about the
influence of changing sensibilities on penal form, but whether they drive
the change or follow it, it is undeniable that over time attitudes have shifted
and that which was once acceptable (whipping in public, for example)
comes to be seen as abhorrent.264 Thus, it was not only to minimize the
bloody or sanguinary effects of England’s criminal code that Americans
sought reform, they also sought to reduce the public infliction of pain and
suffering on convicts.265
261
262

MASUR, supra note 14, at 79; RUSH, supra note 251, at 7–8.
GARLAND, supra note 16, at 223. Summarized by David Garland, the argument is

that:
[T]he sight of violence, pain, or physical suffering has become highly disturbing and distasteful
to modern sensibilities. Consequently it is minimized wherever possible, though ironically this
“suppression” of violence is actually premised upon the build-up of a state capacity for violence
so great that it discourages unauthorized violence on the part of others. And where violence does
continue to be used it is usually removed from the public arena, and sanitized or disguised in
various ways, often becoming the monopoly of specialist groups such as the army, the police, or
the prison staff which conduct themselves in an impersonal, professional manner, avoiding the
emotional intensity which such behavior threatens to arouse.

Id.
263

See supra, Part II.A.
McGowen, supra note 123, at 6–7; see also discussion, supra note 123.
265
MASUR, supra note 14, at 76–81; MERANZE, supra note 174, at 126–27. Two authors
studying this process in Europe connect these changes in sensibility to larger changes in the
structure of government, argue that “these developments are closely related to the rise of a
network of states and the changes they underwent. Notably, the disappearance of public
executions is related to the transition from the early modern state, whether absolutist or
patrician, to the nation-state.” SPIERENBERG, supra note 19, at x. See generally ELIAS, supra
note 128. Changes in sensibility have been used to explain the elimination of public
executions during the nineteenth century in America. MASUR, supra note 14, at 3.
Numerous authors have connected changes in sensibility to the American Revolution and
264
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Because of these “scandals” involving the wheelbarrow men, the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons
(“Philadelphia Prison Society”), founded in 1787, called for the abolition of
public labor and asked that “‘more private or even solitary labor’ be
substituted.”266 The Philadelphia Prison Society included some of the most
prominent members of Philadelphia, including Benjamin Rush.267 It
fostered an international exchange of ideas over penal form, corresponding
with John Howard, a noted English penal reformer, and embracing many of
his ideas.268 In 1788, the Supreme Executive Council “sent a message to
the legislature, signed by Benjamin Franklin, recommending that changes
be made in the penal law ‘calculated to render punishment a means of
reformation, and the labour of criminals of profit to the state. Late
experiments in Europe have demonstrated that those advantages are only to
be obtained by temperance, and solitude with labour.’”269
The result of the petition from the Philadelphia Prison Society was a
reformed criminal law in 1789 that transformed the Walnut Street Jail into a
prison.270 During its first ten years, the program implemented at the Walnut
Street Prison became famous throughout the colonies and internationally.
development of the American state. See generally ANDREW BURSTEIN, SENTIMENTAL
DEMOCRACY (1999); SARAH KNOTT, SENSIBILITY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2009);
STEPHEN MENNELL, THE AMERICAN CIVILIZING PROCESS (2007).
266
Sellin, supra note 241, at 328. The Philadelphia Society arose out of an early
Society, the Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed Prisoners, started in 1776 to
provide assistance to prisoners in the Walnut Street Jail. TEETERS, supra note 156, at 19–20.
For more on this society, see generally Negley K. Teeters, The Philadelphia Society for the
Relief of Distressed Prisoners 1776–1777, 24 PRISON J. 452 (1944). For more on the
Philadelphia Prison Society, see generally NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THEY WERE IN PRISON: A
HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISON SOCIETY 1787–1937 (1937).
267
TEETERS, supra note 266, at 4.
268
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 49 (explaining that this correspondence started prior to the
Revolution); IGNATIEFF, supra note 102, at 64. Howard’s work, State of Prisons, was
published in 1777. TEETERS, supra note 156, at 31. In it, Howard “advocated the
establishment of penitentiary-houses in which each convict would be assigned his own cell,
or room, where he would work, sleep and eat.” Id. As this example reveals, although in the
period following the American Revolution there was a tendency to criticize all things British,
“their Anglophobic diatribes were aimed at capital statutes and at public punishments that
they also regarded as inexpedient. Those diatribes notwithstanding, American criminologists
remained eager to learn about English carceral initiatives, and they maintained an active
correspondence with their English counterparts, including John Howard.” HIRSCH, supra
note 99, at 49. Indeed, the same Whig radicals whose thought helped shape the ideology of
the American Revolution were engaged in an attack on penal methods at home as well.
IGNATIEFF, supra note 102201, at 63–64; BAILYN, supra note 9, at 40–41.
269
Sellin, supra note 241, at 328 (quoting Minutes of the Twelfth General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1787–1788, at 102).
270
Skidmore, supra note 215, at 168.
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“During the years 1790 to 1835, many international dignitaries visited this
prison, made careful observations and established modified replicas of it in
their various countries.”271 For example, Robert Turnbull of South Carolina
visited and published an extensive description of the prison in 1796.272 One
historian of the Walnut Street Jail described it as a “mecca for students of
penal reform from various parts of the country as well as from Europe.”273
This included an enthusiastic account of the prison written and published by
Robert Turnball of South Carolina.274 The Philadelphia prison was held out
as “one of the most striking emblems, of progress in refinement.”275
Although the Walnut Street Jail began operating as a prison in 1790, it
was not until 1794 that Pennsylvania engaged in a more extensive revision
of its criminal law.276 An act passed that year which “set up the popular
definition of murder in the first degree and abolished the death penalty for
all other crimes.”277 In 1796, Virginia followed Pennsylvania in an
extensive revision of its capital code.278 At this time, the Virginian
governor wrote to Dr. Caspar Wistar of Philadelphia “requesting
information about Pennsylvania’s experience as well as a copy of the plan
for the Pennsylvania penitentiary.”279 In his request, he referred to “this
humane law.”280 One of the sponsors of the bill described the existing
criminal code as “‘unjust, impolitic, and barbarous.’”281 In 1796, there was
also a pilot project prison in Rhode Island and New York that abolished
corporal punishment.282 In 1798, a prison opened in Kentucky and in 1799,
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Id. at 167.
Sellin, supra note 241, at 330.
273
TEETERS, supra note 156, at 1. Later he argues that “[n]ews of the sweeping reforms
spread abroad. British and French writers commented favorably on the new era of prison
discipline and visitors to Philadelphia from other states wrote of the amazing results that
flowed from the new administration.” Id. at 36.
274
Id. at 43.
275
Id. at 44 (quoting from Philadelphia Monthly Magazine, Vol. I, p. 101 (Feb. 1798)).
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Sellin, supra note 241, at 328.
277
Id. at 328–29.
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Preyer, supra note 103, at 76.
279
Id. at 77.
280
Id. at 77 n.89.
281
Id. at 77 (quoting GEORGE KEITH TAYLOR, SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH DELIVERED IN
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, ON THE BILL TO AMEND THE PENAL LAWS OF THIS
COMMONWEALTH 7, 10–11 (1796). “He charged his colleagues with passively submitting to
a system ‘calculated to awe and crush the humble vassals of monarchy,’ and urged them to
revise the criminal law ‘to comport with the principles of our government.’” Id. at 78
(citation omitted).
282
HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87; MCLENNAN, supra note 99, at 37.
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one opened in New Jersey.283 Thus, the experiment in Philadelphia started
a process of significant changes in American penal form, as public
inflictions of physical suffering gave way to punishments that occurred
entirely behind walls and outside of public view.
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LATE-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PENAL
REFORM

We can draw the following conclusions from these early attempts at
penal reform. First, penal reform was seen as an important component of
the creation of a republican form of government. In this, the colonists were
without a doubt working within a comparative framework. They wanted a
government, and with it a criminal code, that was unlike that found in
England and other countries in Europe. Beyond that, however, they
distinguished themselves from regimes that they saw as even less
enlightened. Terms like ‘barbaric’ or ‘savage’ were used often and had real
content. In discussions of penal codes, references were made to Goth and
Vandals who were among the first ‘barbarians,’ so the term could clearly be
understood historically, but there were also contemporary examples for
writers to draw on, in the form of Indians, Turks, Africans, or the Native
Americans on their own borders. The perception Americans had of all of
these groups, was that they used physical punishments as a means of
terrorizing the population.284 It was in contrast to these examples that the
early Americans sought to reform their penal codes.
Second, the primary concern with regard to the desire to distinguish
themselves from the English was England’s so-called “Bloody Code.” The
sheer number of people executed in England was seen as indicative of a
government that relied on terror to govern its population.285 Numbers alone
were not the only concern, however. Also disturbing to the colonists was
the extreme disproportionality that the code embraced. In referring to the
Bloody Code, it was common to point out that in England, those executed
were not just murderers, but petty thieves as well. Moreover, the Bloody
Code was seen to be ineffectual because it seemed to be arbitrarily applied.
Although the criminal statutes called for death for a wide range of offenses,
not all of those who committed those offenses were executed because of the
use of benefit of the clergy, pardons, and jury nullification.286

283

HIRSCH, supra note 99, at 11 n.87. However, Preyer dates the New Jersey prison to
1797. Preyer, supra note 103, at 78 n.92.
284
See discussion supra pp. 35–38.
285
See discussion supra p. 32.
286
See discussion supra pp. 31–34.
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Third, beyond the death penalty, public, physical punishments short of
death were becoming increasingly problematic. Shifts in penal form were
responding in part, to long-term decreases in interpersonal violence. This
was a trend that spanned Europe and the colonies and extended into the
twentieth century. Duels, whippings, assaults—these forms of physical
violence were becoming decreasingly socially acceptable, which in turn
impacted the emotional response that people had to the site of public
infliction of pain as part of a criminal punishment. Hard labor was
introduced as an alternative not only to the death penalty, but also to other
public corporal punishments, such as whipping.287 In part, this arose from a
breakdown in the communicative event that was public punishment.
Authorities were increasingly concerned with the disorder that attended
public punishments. The spectators at such events no longer seemed to be
edified by such practices. Indeed, there was a concern that far from
learning respect for the law they were being brutalized or made worse by
it.288 It is here that we see a deeper concern being made manifest—to those
in positions of authority the appropriate emotion that one should feel upon
seeing the physical suffering of another human was sympathy. But if this
were the case, then public physical punishments would either elicit
sympathy for the criminal, or, even worse, deaden the ability of the
spectators to feel sympathy because they would be themselves brutalized by
the public scenes of violence that punishment entailed. Both outcomes
were seen as problematic.
Finally, although reform of the criminal law was seen as an important
component of the process of fashioning a republican style of government,
there were no clear precedents for this reform and all attempts at the local
level were still in an experimental stage. Although leading figures at the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted knew that penal practice was changing,
and they embraced and pushed for that change, they did not know what it
would ultimately look like. They knew what they did not want it to look
like (England’s Bloody Code, the barbaric or savage practices of the less
civilized), but they did not know exactly what a more enlightened practice
would be. Private work at hard labor was starting to be embraced, and
would soon become the dominant mechanism of punishment, but the
development of this form of punishment was only beginning at the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted.

287
288

See discussion supra pp. 24–26.
See discussion supra pp. 39–42.
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III. REFRAMING CONTEMPORARY EIGHTH AMENDMENT STRUGGLES
This Part examines how the revised history provided in Part II sheds
light on current debates over the meaning and application of the Eighth
Amendment. The argument here is that even those aspects of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence that are treated as ahistorical or are not grounded
in the type of historical argumentation seen in Part I have a history. The
use of concepts such as civilization, progress and evolution, and
proportionality have a history routed in the late eighteenth century.
Examining them in light of their historical context helps us to understand
their content better and, for those scholars and justices who rely on
originalist arguments, provides a justification for their continued relevance
in Eighth Amendment interpretation. The examination in this Part
demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment was one node in a broader history
of penal reform and change. The Eighth Amendment was not an end point
in this process. Rather, it was part and parcel of those broader changes. The
question of penal change, how and why it occurs, did not end in the
eighteenth century. Rather, it is an ongoing process that the Eighth
Amendment attempted to embrace instead of a set list of punishments it
sought to eliminate. Terms that were central to that debate in the eighteenth
century continue to have salience and recur in discussions of the Eighth
Amendment. In order to fully understand and engage the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it is important to understand these key
concepts that arose in the eighteenth century and continued to develop and
change along their own trajectory over the following century. This section
starts by examining the concept of civilization and informs the
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment context. It then looks at the idea of
progress or evolution and how this concept is deployed in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The final section examines the tension between
the concepts of proportionality and cruelty and explores the extent to which
this occurs because of the limited view of past “cruel” punishments
employed so often by the Supreme Court. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to provide an exhaustive examination of these concepts. The
intention is merely to underscore how the revised history of late eighteenthcentury penal change I provide can illuminate some of the persistent
struggles and debates over the Eighth Amendment, its meaning, and its
application.
A. CIVILIZATION

As discussed in Part II, the word “civilization” and the many meanings
associated with it began to gain currency at the end of the eighteenth
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century.289 Within this conception, penal practice at the time of the
Founding was very much understood in international comparative terms.
Officials understood what a reformed penal code would entail, in part by
examining England’s “Bloody Code.” Similarly, the various proposals for
reform took place in the context of an international dialogue concerning
what enlightened or civilized punishment practices were.290 Thus, rather
than being a recent development, the understanding of cruelty or humanity
in international comparative terms goes back to the founding period.
For the next one hundred fifty years, civilization proved to be an
enduring signifier of who Americans thought they were.291 It served this
role in part by describing and distancing who they thought they were not.292
The sense that only people less civilized than the United States would
engage in particular forms of punishment permeates Eighth Amendment
analysis.293 For example, a fact often overlooked in discussions of Weems
is that it involved the United States’ administration of the Philippine
Islands.294 The majority opinion, written by Justice McKenna, made
numerous statements distancing the majority from a system of punishment
designed by a foreign country and implemented in a foreign land.295 For
example: “[i]t must be confessed that [the criminal code], and the sentence
in this case, excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate
adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime.”296 Later, a similar
sentiment is conveyed that someone coming from the perspective of the
American criminal justice system would be astonished by the Philippine
penal code: “[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths.”297 While the
opinion is most frequently examined for its argument that penalties must be
proportionate to the offense,298 it is important not to overlook the deliberate
289

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.B & C.
291
For an exhaustive examination of the use of the term “civilization” in American
history, see generally CHARLES A. BEARD, MARY R. BEARD, 4 THE AMERICAN SPIRIT: A
STUDY OF THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1942).
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MAZLISH, supra note 226, at 24–27.
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See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
88, 99 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 351 (1910).
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Weems, 217 U.S. at 351.
295
Id. at 365, 367.
296
Id. at 365.
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Id. at 366–67.
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See, e.g., William W. Berry, III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69,
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distancing these arguments establish between the penal code of the
Philippine Islands and that of the United States. The seemingly
disproportionate sentence is shocking to Justice McKenna precisely because
it is out of tune with American practice. It “excite[s] wonder” in and
“amaze[s] those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state
to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American
commonwealths.”299 Later in the opinion, Justice McKenna declined to
closely examine state court decisions interpreting the meaning of cruel and
unusual punishment because:
It may be said of all of them that there was not such challenge to the import and
consequence of the inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments as the law under
consideration presents. It has no fellow in American legislation. Let us remember
300
that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours.

Later in that same paragraph, he referred to it as having an “alien source.”301
In Justice McKenna’s opinion, the American system served as the yardstick
against which the Philippine system was found very much wanting.302
Trop v. Dulles303 presented a different set of issues, yet also focused on
the relationship between the penalty in question (the denationalization of
individuals dishonorably discharged from the military for desertion) and the
practice in civilized countries.304 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
majority, stated that “[t]he question is whether this penalty subjects the
individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”305 Later, he makes the same
argument, assuming that in general, American practice would be considered
“enlightened”: “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
108–10 (2011); Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 1, at 796. But see Margaret Raymond,
“No Fellow in American Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of
Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2006) (arguing that the fact that Weems was
analyzing a punishment imposed in the Philippines explains why the proportionality analysis
applied subsequently by the Supreme Court has been so muddled).
299
Weems, 217 U.S. at 365, 366–67.
300
Id. at 377.
301
Id.
302
Justice White’s dissent also refers to practice in “any civilized country” and uses the
foreignness of the Philippines as a justification for not judging the penal law of that country.
Id. at 384 (White, J., dissenting) (“[A]s these considerations involve the necessity for a
familiarity with local conditions in the Philippine Islands which I do not possess, such want
of knowledge at once additionally admonishes me of the wrong to arise from forming a
judgment upon insufficient data, or without a knowledge of the subject-matter upon which
the judgment is to be exerted.”). Id.
303
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
304
Id. at 99.
305
Id. at 99.

1. BRAATZ

458

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

BRAATZ

[Vol. 106

stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. . . . This Court has had little occasion to give precise content to
the Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this
is not surprising.”306 The problem for Chief Justice Warren is that the
penalty in question is not civilized: “[h]e may be subject to banishment, a
fate universally decried by civilized people” and the Chief Justice knows
this because: “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity
that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”307 Justice
Frankfurter, in dissent, used the same framework of analysis, making
factual distinctions rather than analytical ones, between the two opinions:
“[m]any civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in
designated prohibited activities.”308
A similar distinction between the practice in civilized countries and
that believed to occur elsewhere can be seen in Justice Douglas’s
concurrence in Furman, when he made a reference to ancient Hindu law, to
draw an analogy to the discriminatory nature of the American death
penalty: “a Brahman was exempt from capital punishment, and under that
law, ‘[g]enerally, in the law books, punishment increased in severity as
social status diminished.’ We have, I fear, taken in practice the same
position . . . .”309 Here, Justice Douglas is establishing the contours of
civilized practice by pointing to a jurisdiction that he assumes the reader
will understand to be less civilized, and not desirable to emulate.
As these examples demonstrate, the import of the word “civilization”
is that it can only be understood in an international comparative framework.
It embraces more than the nation-state of the United States. This is
confirmed in a number of cases: Justice Marshall concurring in Furman
argued that “[o]nly in a free society could right triumph in difficult times,
and could civilization record its magnificent advancement. . . . We achieve
‘a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism’ and join the
approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their
regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.”310
306

Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
308
Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
309
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citations omitted); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (describing the
district court’s finding that the conditions in Arkansas prisons were “a dark and evil world
completely alien to the free world” to be “amply supported”).
310
Furman, 408 U.S. at 371 (citations omitted). He also argues for civilization being a
process of evolution by arguing: “While England may, in retrospect, look particularly brutal,
Blackstone points out that England was fairly civilized when compared to the rest of
Europe.” Id. at 334.
307
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Similarly, the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma311 explicitly connected the
concept of civilization to practices in other countries:
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person
who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the
views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the
312
Western European community.

The invocation of the terms civilized or civilization in the Eighth
Amendment context appears, however, to have fallen out of favor.
Although Justice Kennedy recently evoked the concept in his majority
opinion in Brown v. Plata313; prior to that opinion, the last justice to
reference civilized standards in an Eighth Amendment context was Justice
O’Connor in Roper v. Simmons.314 She referred to “those sanctions . . . that
civilized society had already repudiated in 1791” and later argued that the
Eighth Amendment draws its meaning “directly from the maturing values
of civilized society.”315 What is noteworthy about these references is that
unlike in Furman or Thompson, there is no explicit link made between
civilized society and other jurisdictions, even though elsewhere, Justice
O’Connor used statistics drawn from international practice to justify the
outcome in the case.316 Thus, while previously the term civilization was
evoked to refer to a group of nations all having achieved the same level of
development, here the concept is reduced to a particular way of
characterizing or understanding our own society.
There is not the space in this Article to resolve precisely why this
concept may have fallen out of favor. I simply note that while the term
“civilization” may have fallen into disfavor in the twenty-first century, the
idea that the practices in comparably situated countries have relevance for
appraising American punishment has not. There are numerous examples of
the Court’s (albeit controversial) reliance on international precedent in
determining the content of evolving standards of decency: Graham v.

311

487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Id. at 830. A similar argument is made by Justice Brennan, dissenting in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The views of organizations
with expertise in relevant fields and the choices of governments elsewhere in the world also
merit our attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society.”).
313
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has
no place in civilized society.”).
314
543 U.S. 551, 589, 605 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
315
Id. at 589, 605.
316
Id. at 604.
312
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Florida,317 Roper v. Simmons,318 a footnote in Atkins v. Virginia,319 Enmund
v. Florida,320 and Coker v. Georgia.321 While sometimes the argument is
made in purely numerical terms (such as the argument in Coker that of sixty
nations surveyed only three retained the death penalty for rape322), or is
merely a generalized reference to the “other nations who share our AngloAmerican heritage”323 or simply “Western Europe,”324 the Court sometimes
points specifically to those countries that have not abolished the death
penalty as a means of indicating who Americans should not want to
emulate. For example, in dissent in Stanford, Justice Brennan listed the
other countries in the world that have executed juveniles under eighteen:
“Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados.”325 Similarly, in Roper and
Graham, the majority pointed to the fact that Article 37(a) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by every
nation except the United States and Somalia.326 The implication is that
317
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (noting “support for our conclusion in the fact that, in
continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit
homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over”).
318
543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (arguing that “[o]ur determination that the death
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty”).
319
536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (pointing to the fact that “[w]ithin the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”).
320
458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (finding it is “worth noting that the doctrine of felony
murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number
of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe”).
321
433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (stating that it is “not irrelevant here that out of 60
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape
where death did not ensue”); see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Joan L. Larsen,
Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist
Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65
OHIO ST. L. J. 1283 (2004). For a fuller discussion of the use of international precedent, see
also Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. (Lori
Fisler Damrosch & Bernard Oxman eds., 2004).
322
433 U.S. at 596 n.10; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting seventy countries that have abolished the death penalty).
323
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
324
Id.; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (referring to Commonwealth countries
and continental Europe).
325
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
326
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
576 (2005). This article prohibits the imposition of either the death penalty or “life
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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these are not countries that the United States would want to be compared to.
They are, in other words, not civilized. Thus, the Court has moved from
explicit references to barbaric versus civilized practices to comparing those
countries that have embraced particular practices versus those who have
rejected them. This leaves implicit the judgment that those practices and the
societies that embrace them are not civilized.
These international comparisons largely occur in the context of death
penalty cases. With the exception of juvenile life-imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, they have not made their way into the imprisonment
cases, even though such a comparison could be made, with regard to length
of sentences, types of crimes so punished, and conditions of confinement.327
In part this could be a result of the complexity of the analysis that would be
required to conduct a comparative study with regard to sentence length.328
It could also be a result of the terms by which sentences of imprisonment
are evaluated by the Court (as involving questions of proportionality rather
than cruelty). The history of Founding thought outlined in Part II, however,
as well as the Court’s continued embrace of the relevance of international
comparison suggests that this would be a fruitful line of argument for
advocates. The Founders had a narrative of what it meant to be a republic
that embraced a distinction between the “despotic” monarchical practices of
England and the more rational approach advocated for the republic. Their
definition of a republic entailed a government that valued its citizens and
avoided subjecting them to a “Bloody Code.” A similar narrative could be
drawn today in discussions of the United States’ extreme departure from
international practice in terms of our use of imprisonment. Terms such as
civilization may no longer be common but there continues to be a sense that
the United States aspires to treat its citizens better than may be the case
under harsher forms of government (as seen in the negative comparisons to
practices in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Barbados, and Somalia). The

327
See, e.g., James P. Lynch & William Alex Pridemore, Crime in International
Perspective, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds. 2011);
Marc Mauer, The International Use of Incarceration, 75 PRISON J. 113 (1995). But see James
Lynch, A Cross-National Comparison of the Length of Custodial Sentences for Serious
Crimes, 10 JUST. Q. 639 (1993) (finding that when crime rates are controlled for, the “time
served in the United States for violent crimes is similar to that in other industrialized
democracies”).
328
See, e.g., Gordon C. Barclay, The Comparability of Data on Convictions and
Sanctions: Are International Comparisons Possible?, 8 EUROPEAN J. CRIM. POL. &
RESEARCH 13 (2000) (examining the various complications involved in comparing
sentencing data among European nations); Warren Young & Mark Brown, Cross-national
Comparisons of Imprisonment, 17 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1993) (discussing techniques for
creating meaningful cross-national comparisons of imprisonment).
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significance of these comparisons, first to the practice among civilized
countries and then simply among the international community, is in part
that they can be traced back to the Founding belief that civilization and
America’s development along the continuum from barbaric to savage to
civilized required a reformed penal practice, one that was less cruel and
more rational than that found in the “old world.”
B. PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION

The concept of civilization is closely linked to the concept of progress
or evolution and was seen as a state achieved after savagery or barbarism.329
The idea of progress or evolution is deeply imbedded in the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Trop contained the now oft repeated maxim:
“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”330 There are
numerous references in the early cases to this evolution, such as Justice
Stewart’s in Robinson v. California,331 who argued that “[i]t is unlikely that
any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a criminal
offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with
venereal disease.”332 Justice Blackmun made reference to this idea of
evolution in his dissent in Furman, stating that the majority decision could
be seen to be “the compassionate decision for a maturing society” or that
“we are moving down the road toward human decency,” or “that we are less

329

See, e.g., MENNELL, supra note 265, at 26–28 (citing Jefferson’s use of “civilization”
frequently in conjunction with “other symptoms of progress”). For example:
Let a philosophic observer commence a journey from the savages of the Rocky Mountains,
eastwardly towards our seacoast. These he would observe in the earliest stage of association
living under no law but that of nature, subsisting and covering themselves with the flesh and
skins of wild beasts. He would next find those on our frontiers in the pastoral state, raising
domestic animals to supply the defects of hunting. Then succeed our own semi-barbarous
citizens, the pioneers of the advance of civilization, and so in his progress he would meet the
gradual shades of improving man until he would reach his, as yet, most improved state in our
seaport towns. This, in fact, is equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of many from the
infancy of creation to the present day. I am eighty-one years of age; born where I now live, in the
first range of mountains in the interior of our country. And I have observed this march of
civilization advancing from the seacoast, passing over us like a cloud of light, increasing our
knowledge and improving our condition, insomuch as that we are at this time more advanced in
civilization here than the seaports were when I was a boy. And where this progress will stop no
one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of
amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth.

Id. at 27 (quoting JEFFERSON, supra note 66, at 75).
330
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
331
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
332
Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
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barbaric than we were.”333 So pervasive is the concept of progress that
Justice Powell, also dissenting in Furman, declared: “It is, however, within
the historic process of constitutional adjudication to challenge the
imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric manner.”334 He then went
on to delineate changing sensibilities with regard to penal practice: “Neither
the Congress nor any state legislature would today tolerate pillorying,
branding, or cropping or nailing of the ears—punishments that were in
existence during our colonial era. . . . Similarly, there may well be a process
of evolving attitude with respect to the application of the death sentence for
particular crimes.”335 Thus, although Powell did not think that evolving
standards had progressed to the point of opposing any sentence of death, he
did not disagree with the notion that sensibilities could and do change.
Even while concepts of progress and evolution pervade the Eighth
Amendment cases, there has been a significant shift in how both scholars
and the justices think of penal reform and progress. For over a century and
a half following the Founding, the story of penal reform was told as one of
progressive humanitarianism.336 Starting with revisionist historians in the
1970s,337 however, that narrative of progress and change has increasingly
come into question. It should be noted that the argument made in Part II is
in marked contrast to how the history of the prison has been told since the
1970s.338 Starting with the work of David Rothman in the United States,
333
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The fact
that he is dissenting does not mean that he does not believe in progress. For example, his
argument can also be seen in his argument that the Court’s decision might require mandatory
death sentences: “[t]his approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive
and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of
punishment. I thought we had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago.” Id. at
413.
334
Id. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting).
335
Id. at 430.
336
See generally Michael Ignatieff, State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions: A
Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE STATE
(Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull eds., 1983).
337
See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 81; IGNATIEFF, supra, note 102201; ROTHMAN,
supra note 159.
338
For a critique of these historical debates, see Preyer, supra note 100, at 251.

Recent revisionist scholarship has tended to minimize the reformist impulse of the eighteenth
century, attributing change instead to economic factors alone, or to the necessity for social
control of the populace by ruling groups, or to the relationship between the origins of the modern
prison and the formation of the modern state. Such interpretations have offered healthy
correctives to earlier models that explained change solely in terms of the ideas of humanitarian
reformers divorced from the social context in which historical change inevitably takes place.
Yet, does the social context have no room for the examination of changed modes of thinking, of
perceiving reality? No room for examining the role of those who convey that alteration of

1. BRAATZ

464

3/2/2017 2:40 PM

BRAATZ

[Vol. 106

and Michel Foucault in France, contemporary historians have focused on
the prison as a development unique to the nineteenth century.339 Foucault’s
account of a sharp contrast between pre-modern penalties, with his graphic
description of a man being drawn and quartered, and modern, disciplinary
penalties, is the most well-known of these revisionist accounts.340 Both
Foucault and Rothman emphasize the internal arrangements of the
penitentiary as its distinguishing characteristic.341 The discussion in Part II
reveals that these accounts oversimplify how and when penal change occurs
and rely upon a misleading dichotomy between “modern” and “premodern” penalties. Only by recognizing the significant changes in penal
form that were already occurring at the end of the eighteenth century, as
well as how those changes played into the larger narrative of the place of
penal change within the creation of the American republic, can we begin to
grasp the tenuous basis of any purported distinction between the modern
and pre-modern.
It is not just that historians began to call into question the narrative of
progressive humanitarianism embraced by penal reformers, however.
David Garland points to a “pervasive sense of failure, fuelled by the sharply
increasing crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s,” that “would eventually lead
to a questioning of the state’s ability to control crime and a rethinking of the
role of criminal justice.”342 This “sense of failure,” meant that “the criminal
justice system came to be viewed primarily in terms of its limitations and
propensity for failure rather than its prospects for future success.”343 Thus,
the progressive narrative of penal reform was attacked by historians at the
same time that the efficacy of the criminal justice system came under
attack. Within this new crime control culture, there was a marked decline
in belief in progress.
As with the concept of civilization, the Supreme Court has failed to
embrace a notion of evolution or progress in Eighth Amendment prison
cases. In part, this could be a result of how the narrative of penal progress
has typically unfolded, with the prison standing in contrast to past, clearly
cruel, punishments. On its face, that narrative leaves little room for an

sensibility that in itself becomes an historical artifact, even though less subject to empirical
quantitative analysis than other data?

Id.
339

See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 81; ROTHMAN, supra note 159.
FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 3–7.
341
Id. at 6–31; ROTHMAN, supra note 159, at 79–108.
342
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 62 (2002).
343
Id. at 107.
340
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understanding of progressive prison reform. This might also be attributed
to the changing culture of control, in which there is no longer a faith that
the state can or should implement a prison regime that accomplishes
anything beyond incapacitation. Of course this is not to say that the Eighth
Amendment has no application in the prison context, far from it. It is only
to point out that there is little mention of progress or evolution in the
context of discussion of prison policies.
Within the context of the death penalty, however, the narrative of
progress or evolution continues, and it provides the primary justifications
for a number of cases, including Coker, Enmund, Atkins, Roper, Graham,
and Miller. Yet, the methods that the Court uses to divine the evolving
standards of decency have opened the door to a notion of evolution that is
willing to contemplate regression. This can be seen most clearly in
Kennedy v. Louisiana,344 in which there was some debate regarding the
significance of the fact that six jurisdictions had recently made rape of a
child a capital offense.345 The majority failed to hold that evolving
standards could not go in the direction of expanding the death penalty.346
The dissent, on the other hand, indicated that they believed such a reading
could certainly be plausible.347 Justice Scalia, in dissent, noted that six
states had enacted new child-rape laws since 1977:
I do not suggest that six new state laws necessarily establish a “national consensus” or
even that they are sure evidence of an ineluctable trend. In terms of the Court’s
metaphor of moral evolution, these enactments might have turned out to be an
evolutionary dead end. But they might also have been the beginning of a strong new
evolutionary line. We will never know, because the Court today snuffs out the line in
348
its incipient stages.

Although Justice Scalia evokes the concept of evolution, he decouples it
from the idea of progress. Under his account, evolution could occur in any
direction, even towards a harsher system of punishment.
A related argument was made by Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in
344

554 U.S. 407 (2008).
Id. at 431–33 (analyzing the question of whether six states adopting the death penalty
for child rape constituted a “direction of change” in support of that penalty).
346
Id. at 431 (“Whatever the significance of consistent change where it is cited to show
emerging support for expanding the scope of the death penalty, no showing of consistent
change has been made in this case.”). Similar hesitancy can be seen in Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent in Glossip v. Gross, in which she argued that “[c]ertainly, use of the firing squad
could be seen as a devolution to a more primitive era” but then went on the assert “[t]hat is
not to say, of course, that it would therefore be unconstitutional.” 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796–97
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
347
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348
Id.
345
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Miller v. Alabama,349 when he argued that “[a]s judges we have no basis for
deciding that progress towards greater decency can move only in the
direction of easing sanctions on the guilty.”350 Indeed, he argued that “[i]n
this case, there is little doubt about the direction of society’s evolution” and
went on the point to the fact that for most of the century, life without parole
was not an option and it was only starting in the 1980s when “outcry
against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the rehabilitative model,
and other factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility
of parole.”351 It is thus an open question whether evolution must always go
in one direction.
This dispute is in part the result of a sustained critique by certain
justices of the very notion of evolving standards of decency. One precursor
to the Kennedy debate can be found in Justice Scalia’s relentless
questioning of any narrative of change. For example, in Thompson, Justice
Scalia characterized the majority’s argument as stating “that a 4-decade
trend is adequate to justify calling a constitutional halt to what may well be
a pendulum swing in social attitudes.”352 Instead, he argued that there were
many explanations for change that have nothing to do with changing
sensibilities of the American people: “[t]here are many reasons that
adequately account for the drop in executions other than the premise of
general agreement that no 15-year-old murderer should ever be
executed.”353 Similarly, dissenting in Atkins, Justice Scalia argued:
The Eighth Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere “cruel” punishments,
such as the rack and the thumbscrew. But where the punishment is in itself
permissible “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to
354
changed social conditions.”

In this, we see the heart of Justice Scalia’s critique and a question that is
embraced by other Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts: Does change
always go in the direction of less harshness? Once society has evolved to a
349

132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2478.
351
Id. Chief Justice Roberts argues that “most States have changed their laws relatively
recently to expose teenage murderers to mandatory life without parole.” Id. Similarly, Justice
Alito, also dissenting in Miller (with Justice Scalia joining) asked: “Is it true that our society
is inexorably evolving in the direction of greater and greater decency? Who says so, and how
did this particular philosophy of history find its way into our fundamental law?” Id. at 2487.
352
487 U.S. 815, 869 (1988).
353
Id.
354
536 U.S. 338, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 990 (1991)).
350
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particular level of sensibilities with regard to punishment, could it go back?
In contrast to his opinion in Miller, Chief Justice Roberts heartily
embraced a conception of progress when writing for the majority in Baze,
where he made repeated references to the “more humane means of carrying
out the sentence” and argued “that progress has led to the use of lethal
injection by every jurisdiction that imposes the death penalty.”355 He
argued that the states had fulfilled their legislative function “with an earnest
desire to provide for a progressively more humane manner of death.”356
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion seems to rely upon a belief in the
concept of progress as integral to the determination of the Eighth
Amendment’s scope. If there is an alternative procedure that is “feasible,
readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of
severe pain” then a state’s refusal to adopt “such an alternative in the face
of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological
justification for adhering to its current method of execution, then a State’s
refusal to change its method can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’ under the
Eighth Amendment.”357
Much more work can and should be done to evaluate the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding evolving standards of decency. My intention in
this Article is merely to underline the fact that from the founding moment, a
particular conception of progress was central to understandings of the
Eighth Amendment. It held that as America created a republic and thereby
became more civilized, its penal code would become less harsh. Indeed,
this was understood to be a defining difference between a monarchy and a
republic.358 This conception of the relevance of progress for evaluating
penal form has been called into question, starting in the second half of the
twentieth century. The Court’s jurisprudence in this regard appears
muddled, I suggest, because its members, in marked contrast to the
Founders, do not share a unitary conception of what progress entails.
C. PROPORTIONALITY VERSUS CRUELTY

Civilization is also connected to another aspect of the enduring legacy
of eighteenth-century penal reform on Eighth Amendment interpretation—
the place of the body in understanding cruelty. Part II emphasized the
extent to which the penal reform pursued in the late eighteenth century

355

553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring; Kennedy, J., and Alito, J.,
joining).
356
Id. at 51.
357
Id. at 52.
358
See supra Part II.B.
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focused almost exclusively on eliminating public, physical punishments.359
As was outlined in the above discussion of Pennsylvania’s experiment with
public hard labor, this reflects changing sensibilities towards the sight of
physical violence imposed on the body.
This understanding that cruelty is somehow closely linked to physical
violence can be seen in Supreme Court cases. For example, in his dissent in
O’Neil, Justice Field argued that if the punishment in question involved
whipping instead of a term of imprisonment then “a cry of horror would rise
from every civilized and Christian community of the country against it.”360
This “cry of horror” is an expression of a particular sensibility towards
violence inflicted on the body. References to sensibilities continued well
into the twentieth century, although the term itself is not used the concept
can be seen in expressions of a way of feeling about a particular
punishment. Civilization itself was frequently used as a shorthand for
particular sensibilities. Central to this idea of sensibilities is the fact that
they are expressed as a way of feeling. Thus, Supreme Court justices
frequently referenced civilization in their opinions to characterize ineffable
qualities that distinguish those who tolerate particular punishments from
those who do not.361 Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson, argued that
“[t]he Eighth Amendment expresses the revulsion of civilized man against
barbarous acts—the ‘cry of horror’ against man’s inhumanity to his fellow
man.”362 Similarly, Justice Burton, dissenting in Resweber, argued that
“[t]aking human life by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most
fundamental instincts of civilized man.”363 Justice Marshall in Ford v.
Wainwright364 referred to the “natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at
359

See supra Part II.C.
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
361
See supra pp. 48–50.
362
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). Brennan
in Furman, also linked the Eighth Amendment with concepts of civilization: “the command
of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those
convicted of crimes.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In his dissent in Gregg, Justice Brennan referenced civilization three separate
times. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 228–29 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The Eighth
Amendment “embodies in unique degree moral principles restraining the punishments that
our civilized society may impose on those persons who transgress its laws;” the Court has
the duty to declare “that the law has progressed to the point where we should declare that the
punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer
morally tolerable in our civilized society;” and “[m]y opinion in Furman v. Georgia
concluded that our civilization and the law had progressed to this point.”).
363
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
364
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
360
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killing” the insane and stated that “such an execution simply offends
humanity.”365 In all of these examples, the concept of “civilization”
expresses an ineffable quality that relates to our ability to feel horror and
shock at the sight of the pain and suffering of the human body.
At the same time, because late eighteenth-century reforms were not
only about reducing bodily violence but also about privatizing
punishment,366 the public no longer “sees” the punishment. For this reason,
the process of civilization that calls forth feelings of abhorrence may be
short-circuited by the very civilizing process that helped create those
feelings in the first place. The instances where the Court has found an
Eighth Amendment violation in the prison context generally involve
examples of the Court uncovering instances of physical mistreatment.367
The most recent decision in Brown underscores this point. Kennedy’s
opinion is full of examples of the physical suffering of the prisoners as a

365

Id. at 409.
See supra Part II.C.
367
Compare, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (finding the inadequate
medical care provided by California prisons to be an Eighth Amendment violation), and
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (finding Eighth Amendment violation when inmate was
handcuffed to a hitching post), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding that the
requirement of humane prisons conditions under the Eighth Amendment is violated if the
inmate faced substantial risk of serious harm), and Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35
(1993) (finding a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment in allegations that the
prisoner was exposed “to levels of [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose an unreasonable
risk of serious damage to his future health”), and Hudson v. McMIllian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)
(finding potential Eighth Amendment claim in a beating a prisoner received from guards),
and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (finding Arkansas prisons conditions
unconstitutional), and Jackson v. Bishop, 404 U.S. 571 (1968) (holding use of strap as a
disciplinary measure within the prison to be cruel), with Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (failing to find an Eighth Amendment violation in a sentence of two consecutive
twenty-five year to life sentences for three minor thefts), and Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63 (2003) (same), and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that a
forty-year sentence imposed for possession of nine ounces of marihuana did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (failing to find
an Eighth Amendment violation in a mandatory life sentence imposed following three
relatively minor felonies). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (identifying
conditions of confinement that might amount to an Eighth Amendment violation as including
deprivations of an “identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise”); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–49 (1981) (failing to find an Eighth Amendment violation in
double celling, and finding that only deprivations that deny “the minimal civilized measures
of life’s necessities” sufficiently serious to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (contemplating, though ultimately failing
to find, an Eighth Amendment violation in inadequate medical care). But see Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding sentence of life without parole for minor crime to be
disproportional and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
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result of overcrowding.368 Indeed, the opinion includes three photographs
of conditions inside California prisons so that we can “see” the
mistreatment.369 Not unrelatedly, Kennedy’s opinion is an exception to
recent trends as it explicitly evokes standards of civilized society.
While the previous examples linked civilization with a feeling of
abhorrence when confronted with particular penal practices, later opinions
explicitly reference when pain may be imposed. Justice Brennan,
concurring in Furman, argued that “[t]he primary principle is that
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings. Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment.”370 Later,
he argued that “death remains as the only punishment that may involve the
conscious infliction of physical pain.”371 Roberts, discussing what he
perceives to be the growing humanity of the manners in which the death
penalty is imposed in the United States, distinguishes the practice from
what occurred historically: “[w]hat each of the forbidden punishments had
in common was the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain—
‘superadd[ing]’ pain to the death sentence through torture and the like.”372
One result of this approach has been that in order to find a violation of
the Eighth Amendment, the Court requires some analogy between the
punishment in question and torture. For example, in Trop: “It is a form of
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the
political existence that was centuries in the development.”373 This point
was explicitly rejected by the dissenters: “The very substantial rights and
privileges that the alien in this country enjoys under the federal and state
constitutions puts him in a very different condition from that of an outlaw in
fifteenth-century England.”374 Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis v. Ayala375
suggests a similar approach with regard to solitary confinement, creating an
368

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–27 (2011).
Id. at 1949–50.
370
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Though he
went on to argue that:
369

When we consider why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is
not the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the
human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity.

Id. at 272–73.
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Id. at 288.
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analogy with torture.376
The result is an ambiguous application of the Eighth Amendment in
imprisonment cases. There is a distinction between the cases that examine
prison conditions and contemplated the possibility of or actually found
Eighth Amendment violations, and length of sentence cases that have
almost uniformly failed to find Eighth Amendment violations.377 This is
because the former focus on the concept of cruelty and its relationship to
the physical infliction of pain on the body of the offender, whereas the latter
focus on proportionality and leave cruelty almost entirely out of the
equation. If, however, cruelty is not to be limited to a particular set of
punishments present at the Founding, and instead represents the process by
which types of punishment come to be seen as cruel, then its application
ought not to be limited to situations that involve the physical application of
pain to the prisoner’s body. Rather, advocates need to develop ways of
discussing extreme deprivations of time with society, family, and
community in terms of cruelty. In this way, application of the Eighth
Amendment to length of sentence should be expanded beyond examinations
of proportionality, which the Court has found to be less than illuminating.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important thing that we can say about the Eighth
Amendment is that it exists. Penal form played a key role in late eighteenthcentury understandings of what it meant to be a republic, what it meant to
be civilized, and what it meant to be a person capable of proper feeling vis à
vis other members of the society. It is for these reasons that the protections
included in the Eighth Amendment were considered important enough to
include in the Bill of Rights. This Article departs from histories of the
Eighth Amendment that tend to treat particular penal methods in a static
way—as though the only distinction that can be drawn is between the socalled Stuart horrors and eighteenth-century penal practice.378 Part II
376

Id. at 2209–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Thus, compare Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), which, although it did
not find an Eighth Amendment violation on the particular facts of that case, was willing to
consider that there could be one if the physical injury to the prisoner had risen to the level of
being “significant,” with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991), in which the
Court would only find a prison sentence unconstitutional if it was grossly disproportionate
(in Harmelin, a life sentence without possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of
cocaine was not grossly disproportionate).
378
See, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at 94, 97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the ‘inflict[ion]’ of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’
must be understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to include it in the
Bill of Rights,” and concluding that “the Eighth Amendment was intended to disable
377
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demonstrated that the final two decades of the eighteenth century were
marked by significant changes in penal form as state legislatures sought to
shape the criminal law and penal practice into a form they deemed more
appropriate to a civilized and republican government.379 Beyond this,
however, Part II demonstrated that these discussions were part of a larger
change in sensibilities that related to how people thought about the public
infliction of pain. Understanding these aspects of the history illuminate
aspects of contemporary debates over the Eighth Amendment, including the
use of international comparison, debates over the question of progress and
how it occurs, and the use of proportionality rather than cruelty in
evaluating terms of imprisonment.

Congress from imposing tortuous punishments”).
379
See supra Part II.

